The Realities of Electoral Reform by Stephanopoulos, Nicholas et al.
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers Working Papers
2015




Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/
public_law_and_legal_theory
Part of the Law Commons
Chicago Unbound includes both works in progress and final versions of articles. Please be aware that
a more recent version of this article may be available on Chicago Unbound, SSRN or elsewhere.
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Working Papers at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Public
Law and Legal Theory Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact
unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Eric McGhee & Steven Rogers, "The Realities of Electoral Reform" (University of Chicago Public Law &
Legal Theory Working Paper No. 518, 2015).
CHICAGO 
PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER NO. 518 
 
 
THE REALITIES OF ELECTORAL REFORM 
 




THE LAW SCHOOL 




This paper can be downloaded without charge at the Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series:  
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/publiclaw/index.html 
and The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection. 
THE REALITIES OF ELECTORAL REFORM 
 
67 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) 
 
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos* 




What good are theories if they cannot be tested? Election law has wrestled 
with this question over the last generation. Two new theories have emerged 
during this period that reject conventional rights-and-interests balancing. In its 
place, the responsiveness theory asserts that legislators’ positions should be 
sensitive to changes in the views of their constituents. Similarly, the alignment 
theory claims that voters’ and legislators’ preferences should be congruent.  
Unfortunately, both of these theories share a common flaw: They provide no 
way for anyone to tell whether electoral policies improve or worsen 
responsiveness or alignment. They operate at too normative a level to be useful 
to practically minded courts or policymakers. They are caught in clouds of 
abstraction. 
This Article is an attempt to pull the theories down from the clouds. In the 
last few years, data has become available, for the first time, on voters’ and 
legislators’ preferences at the state legislative level. We use this data to calculate 
responsiveness and alignment for both individual legislators and whole 
legislative chambers, across the country and over the last two decades. We also 
pair these calculations with a new database of state electoral policies that covers 
the areas of (1) franchise access, (2) party regulation, (3) campaign finance, (4) 
redistricting, and (5) governmental structure. This pairing enables us to estimate 
the policies’ actual effects on responsiveness and alignment. 
Our results mean that laws’ representational impact now is a matter of 
empirics, not conjecture. Courts that wish to decide cases in accordance with the 
responsiveness or alignment theories may do so by consulting our findings. 
Policymakers who aim to enact beneficial reforms may do the same. And 
academics no longer have an excuse for debating the theories from a purely 
normative perspective. Now that the “is” has been intertwined with the “ought,” 
the “is” no longer may be ignored. 
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Two major theories of election law share a common flaw. They both assert 
that electoral policies should be assessed based on whether they promote or 
inhibit a certain kind of relationship between voters’ and representatives’ 
preferences. But neither theory offers any way to tell whether policies actually 
produce this relationship. Neither theory, that is, offers any practical guidance to 
courts or policymakers who wish to heed its recommendations. 
Take the responsiveness theory that Sam Issacharoff and Rick Pildes 
pioneered, and that is now the dominant approach in the election law literature.1 
                                                 
 
1 For some of the key articulations of the theory, see Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political 
Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593 (2002); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan 
Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998); and Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 
2003 Term; Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29 (2004). For a 
sense of the theory’s centrality in the election law literature, see RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND 
ELECTION LAW 139 (2003) (“The Issacharoff-Pildes model is becoming the new election law orthodoxy . . . .”); 
Joseph Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual Right to Vote, 86 IND. L.J. 1289, 1290 (2011) (describing 
the “emerging consensus” in favor of the Issacharoff-Pildes approach); and Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of 
Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 649, 651 (2002) (noting how “attention in the field has shifted . . . . toward an emphasis on 
electoral competition”).  
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The theory contends that officeholders’ positions should be responsive to the 
views of their constituents. If the constituents’ preferences shift in a particular 
direction, then so should the officeholders’ preferences. But how are we 
supposed to know whether a given policy—a photo identification requirement, 
say, or a limit on campaign contributions—increases or decreases 
responsiveness? How are we supposed to operationalize the value that 
Issacharoff and Pildes have identified? Unfortunately, the theory provides no 
answer.2 
Or take the alignment theory that many political scientists endorse, and that 
one of us has applied to election law in earlier work.3 The theory argues that 
representatives’ positions should be congruent with voters’ views. If voters hold 
certain preferences, then so should their representatives. But how do we figure 
out whether a given reform—an open primary, say, or an independent 
redistricting commission—is aligning or misaligning? How do we convert the 
abstract ideal of preference congruence into usable instructions for judges and 
legislators? Again, alas, the theory comes up empty. 
To be fair, this flaw in the responsiveness and alignment theories was 
unavoidable until very recently. To determine the effects of different electoral 
policies, it is necessary to have (1) substantial policy variation across time and 
space; (2) a measure of voters’ preferences; and (3) a measure of legislators’ 
preferences.4 At the congressional level, data on voters’ and legislators’ 
preferences has long been available, but there is insufficient policy variation to 
come to any robust conclusions. Too many rules are set federally and thus do not 
differ year by year or state by state.5 At the state legislative level, conversely, 
states have experimented with all sorts of electoral policies, but in the past there 
was little data on voters’ or legislators’ preferences. The districts were too small 
and the politicians too obscure for much information to be gathered. 
This situation has changed dramatically over the past few years. As to voters’ 
preferences, a pair of political scientists merged a series of surveys and then used 
a new statistical technique to produce public opinion estimates at the state 
legislative district level.6 One of us also compiled presidential election results 
                                                 
 
2 Other scholars who have made this point include Yasmin Dawood, The Antidomination Model and the 
Judicial Oversight of Democracy, 96 GEO. L.J. 1411, 1423 (2008) (“[I]t is difficult to ascertain when the right 
level of partisan competition has been achieved.”); and Daniel A. Farber, Implementing Equality, 3 ELECTION 
L.J. 371, 376 (2004) (observing that “structural considerations are difficult to manage”). 
3 See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 283 (2014); see also, 
e.g., Andrew Rehfield, Representation Rethought: On Trustees, Delegates, and Gyroscopes in the Study of 
Political Representation and Democracy, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 214, 219 (2009) (“The reigning view within 
empirical political science presumes the delegate model of representation as the ideal.”); Andrew Sabl, Does 
“Democracy” Mean that Outcomes Should Track Voter Preferences? Why Empirical Political Scientists 
Assume the Answer Is Yes and Political Theorists Assume It’s No 4 (Sept. 1, 2012) (noting that “many political 
scientists . . . assume . . . something like the correspondence theory”). 
4 It also is helpful to have a large number of cases to study. While there are only 435 congressional 
districts in the country, there are more than 7000 state legislative districts—a much more suitable data universe 
for state-level analysis.  
5 This is most true with respect to campaign finance and governmental structure policies. 
6 See Chris Tausanovitch & Christopher Warshaw, Measuring Constituent Policy Preferences in 
Congress, State Legislatures, and Cities, 75 J. POL. 330 (2013) (acquiring pool of 275,000 respondents by 
merging surveys). 
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aggregated by state legislative district for a substantial number of prior elections.7 
As to legislators’ preferences, another pair of political scientists assembled roll 
call voting data for all fifty states and then used this information to calculate state 
legislator ideal points.8 Still another political scientist estimated state legislators’ 
ideologies by analyzing the identities of their campaign donors.9 Lastly, we 
perused an array of primary and secondary sources in order to code several dozen 
state electoral policies over a two-decade period. Our database, the most 
extensive of its kind, includes policies in the areas of (1) franchise access; (2) 
party regulation; (3) campaign finance; (4) redistricting; and (5) governmental 
structure. 
Armed with this newly available data, we seek in this Article to redress the 
empirical deficiencies of the responsiveness and alignment theories. We seek, in 
other words, to determine what the implications of different electoral policies 
actually are for responsiveness and alignment. We carry out our analysis at the 
levels of both the state legislative district and the state legislative chamber. This 
dual approach allows us to investigate both dyadic representation (i.e., the 
relationship between a particular legislator and her constituents) and collective 
representation (i.e., the relationship between an entire legislative body and all of 
the voters in the state).10 We also carry out our analysis over the 1992-2013 
period and across all fifty states.11 This wide temporal and spatial lens takes full 
advantage of the states’ policy variation and enhances our ability to reach 
conclusions about causality. 
At the dyadic level, we find that most state legislators are misaligned with 
their constituents. Democrats typically are too liberal for their districts’ voters, 
while Republicans typically are too conservative. This misalignment also is not 
symmetric. Republicans tend to be more misaligned than Democrats, and their 
level of misalignment has risen in recent years (while that of Democrats has 
fallen). At the collective level, both alignment and responsiveness vary markedly 
from state to state, but not very much from year to year. The median legislator 
also is too liberal in states governed by Democrats, and too conservative in 
Republican-run states. And the median legislator is positively responsive to 
changes in public opinion in most states, but swings in the opposite direction 
from the electorate in a handful of outliers. 
Turning to the electoral policies that are the Article’s focus, we find that 
several of them have positive effects on alignment and responsiveness, even with 
rigorous controls included in our models. For example, limits on individual 
                                                 
 
7 This was Rogers. See Eric M. McGhee et al., A Primary Cause of Partisanship? Nomination Systems 
and Legislator Ideology, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 337 (2014) (using this data). 
8 See Boris Shor & Nolan McCarty, The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures, 105 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 530 (2011). 
9 See Adam Bonica, Mapping the Ideological Marketplace, 58 AM. J. POL SCI. (forthcoming 2014). 
However, as we discuss in Section II.A, infra, we are unable to use Bonica’s estimates in our analysis because 
of their lower reliability at the state legislative level.  
10 See Robert Weissberg, Collective Vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 535, 
535-37 (1978). 
11 The one minor exception is that we study only chamber-level responsiveness in Nebraska, since its 
legislators do not have official partisan affiliations.  
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campaign contributions improve alignment at the district level, likely because the 
donors whose giving is constrained tend to be ideologically extreme. Similarly, 
the use of an independent commission to draw district lines improves alignment 
at the chamber level, probably because a commission (unlike politicians) has no 
incentive to gerrymander. And sore loser laws, which ban candidates who lose in 
the primaries from running again in the general election, improve alignment at 
both the district and chamber levels. This effect may arise due to defeated 
candidates seeking a second bite at the apple, and thus splitting their party’s vote, 
in the absence of these laws. 
However, the story is not as rosy for all of the policies we examine. For 
instance, certain types of open primaries worsen both alignment and 
responsiveness, likely because they fail to attract more moderate voters to the 
polls. Likewise, public financing schemes are misaligning at the district level, 
probably because the public funds tend to be tied to donations from polarized 
individual donors. Term limits also reduce district-level alignment, as term-
limited legislators evidently represent their constituents less ably. And policies 
that restrict access to the franchise (such as photo identification requirements) 
have little discernible impact on alignment. They may influence turnout, but they 
do not seem to affect representation. 
Our findings have important implications for courts, policymakers, and 
academics alike. Courts, first, may consult our results to evaluate claims that 
policies should be upheld because they promote alignment or responsiveness.12 
Courts have struggled with these claims in the past, but now arguments about 
how policies affect representation may be assessed empirically rather than 
intuitively. Our findings also bolster certain judicial doctrines while undermining 
others. For example, courts’ tendency to uphold franchise restrictions13 seems 
acceptable given their minor impact on alignment; and courts’ aggressive 
scrutiny of open primaries14 may be sensible too given their negative effects on 
alignment and responsiveness. But courts should be more tolerant of limits on 
individual donors,15 which increase alignment; and should prod states more 
forcefully to adopt redistricting commissions,16 which are aligning as well. 
Next, policymakers who hope to improve representation may draw on our 
results to identify policies that serve this goal (and to avoid policies that do not). 
The areas in which representational gains are most attainable, in our view, are 
campaign finance and redistricting.17 Several reforms in these areas produce 
benefits in both district-level and chamber-level alignment. These reforms should 
                                                 
 
12 For a discussion of Supreme Court cases that address alignment, see Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at 
316-20. For a similar discussion focused on responsiveness, see Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 605-06. 
13 See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (plurality opinion) (upholding 
Indiana photo identification requirement). 
14 See, e.g., Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (voiding California blanket primary). 
15 Instead, the Court has struck down limits on individual expenditures, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 
(1976), on aggregate individual contributions, see McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (plurality 
opinion), and on certain non-aggregate individual contributions, see Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006). 
16 Instead, the Court has upheld egregious gerrymanders enacted by the elected branches. See, e.g., League 
of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
17 Sore loser laws also are aligning, but they already are in place in most states. 
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be a high priority for leaders who want American democracy to function more 
effectively. Conversely, there is less reason for these leaders to devote their 
energies to franchise access, party regulation, or governmental structure. Most 
franchise access laws only influence representation at the margins, while several 
common reforms of party regulation and governmental structure are misaligning. 
In these areas, inaction, or even the repeal of existing rules, is preferable to new 
regulatory activity.18 
Lastly, our analysis gives rise to both a research agenda for political 
scientists and theoretical insights for legal academics. Among the many 
worthwhile sequels that political scientists should consider are: generating 
reliable measures of legislator ideology that vary over time; coding electoral 
policies in non-binary fashion; and using voter surveys to place voters’ and state 
legislators’ ideal points on the same scale. Law professors tend not to perform 
such quantitative work, but our results also should be valuable to them due to the 
light they shed on the alignment and responsiveness theories. For one thing, it 
now is possible to apply the theories—to determine with some confidence how 
different policies affect representation. This is a major milestone in the theories’ 
evolution. For another, it turns out that the responsiveness theory is much less 
useful in practice than the alignment theory. Far fewer policies have any impact 
on responsiveness, meaning that it usually cannot be used to distinguish sound 
from unsound reforms. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides the theoretical backdrop for 
our empirical investigation. It articulates the responsiveness and alignment 
theories, summarizes the existing literature on the theories, and identifies certain 
gaps in this literature. Part II, the analytical core of the Article, presents our 
findings on the effects of different electoral policies on responsiveness and 
alignment. It describes the data we use, explains our methodological choices, and 
sets forth the results of our various models. Lastly, Part III considers what our 
conclusions mean for courts, policymakers, and academics. It argues that all three 
sets of actors must rethink their approaches to election law if they hope to 
construct a responsive and aligned political system. 
One more prefatory note: This Article is far from the last word on how 
electoral policies affect representation. In fact, it is more like the first word. All 
of the datasets we rely on are very new, and surely will be refined in the future. 
In addition, a single paper cannot possibly assess with sufficient rigor several 
dozen policies spanning five distinct areas. We believe our analytical techniques 
are valid and generate reliable results. We also believe there is value in breadth 
of coverage, in seeking to evaluate simultaneously a range of reforms. But we 
recognize that more work is necessary before our findings can be seen as 
definitive and not merely suggestive. In fact, we plan to do a good deal of this 
work ourselves as we continue to execute the project that this Article 
commences. 
 
                                                 
 
18 We decline to comment on what reforms should be pursued by policymakers who affirmatively want 
misalignment in their favor. 
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II. THEORETICAL BACKDROP 
 
Before delving into empirics, it is important to say a few words about the 
election law theories whose weaknesses we hope to rectify. We open this Part, 
then, by outlining the key elements of the responsiveness and alignment theories. 
Both theories are structuralist, in the argot of election law scholars, because they 
emphasize structural features of our political system rather than individual rights 
claims. Both theories are concerned as well with achieving a certain kind of 
relationship between voters’ and representatives’ preferences—a responsive 
relationship in one case and a congruent relationship in the other.  
Next, we summarize the existing political science literature on the impact of 
different electoral policies on responsiveness and alignment. A number of studies 
do attempt to quantify these concepts and to analyze their linkages to electoral 
rules. Unfortunately, as we further explain in this Part, most of these efforts are 
deficient in significant respects. Very few studies to date have succeeded in 
measuring both voters’ and representatives’ preferences at the level—the state 
legislative—at which the greatest policy variation arises. As a result, current 
scholarship does not provide courts and policymakers with the necessary tools to 
operationalize the responsiveness and alignment theories. 
 
A. Responsiveness and Alignment 
 
In recent years, the central cleavage in election law has pitted rights-oriented 
against structuralist theories.19 In one camp are scholars who argue (along with 
some Supreme Court Justices) that the rights burdens imposed by electoral 
regulations should be balanced against the state interests that the regulations 
serve.20 The burdens should be permitted only if they are less substantial than the 
gains for the countervailing interests. In the opposite corner are commentators 
who maintain that such rights-and-interests balancing ignores the structural 
dynamics that are truly at stake in electoral disputes.21 These dynamics, 
summarized by Pildes as “the interlocking relationships of the institutions . . . 
that organize the democratic system,”22 should be the focus of judges as well as 
legislators.  
The responsiveness and alignment theories that are the subject of this Article 
both are structuralist approaches.23 Both call attention to democratic values that 
inhere in our political system as a whole, not to individual rights such as speech 
                                                 
 
19 For some of the abundant literature on this cleavage, see HASEN, supra note 1; Guy-Uriel E. Charles, 
Judging the Law of Politics, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1099 (2005); Dawood, supra note 2; Fishkin, supra note 1; and 
Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605 (1999). 
20 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at 292-95 (describing these scholars and Justices as well as their 
arguments). 
21 See id. at 295-98 (describing these commentators and their arguments). 
22 Pildes, supra note 1, at 41. 
23 See, e.g., Pildes, supra note 19, at 1607 (“Professor Samuel Issacharoff and I attempt to . . . develop[] 
one structural aim that the history of American law and democracy suggests should be a particular focal point 
for courts.”); Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at 299 (“Alignment is a quintessential structural value—a value that 
matters to the entire polity, not to any particular group or individual . . . .”). 
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or the franchise. To determine whether a given policy is lawful or advisable, the 
theories advise that its implications for the relevant democratic value be 
ascertained. Its implications for individual rights—or for state interests 
unconnected to the democratic value—are irrelevant. 
Beginning with the responsiveness theory, some readers may be puzzled by 
our label for it. Issacharoff and Pildes, the chief proponents of the theory, are best 
known for their commitment to electoral competition, not responsiveness. But 
they have made clear in numerous works that they view competition as an 
instrumental rather than an intrinsic value. The reason why they regard 
competition as desirable is their belief that it tends to produce a responsive 
political order. Responsiveness, not competition, is their ultimate aim. As they 
write in a seminal article, “Only through an appropriately competitive partisan 
environment can one of the central goals of democratic politics be realized: that . 
. . the political process be responsive to the interests and views of citizens.”24 
Unfortunately, Issacharoff and Pildes are not always clear as to which output 
should be responsive to which input at which level. On the output side, they refer 
at different times to elected officials’ “preferences,”25 to “policy outcomes,”26 
and to “representation” itself.27 On the input side, similarly, they mention the 
“interests of voters”28 on some occasions and the “preferences of the electorate” 
on others.29 And with respect to level, sometimes they argue that individual 
legislators should be responsive to their own constituents,30 and elsewhere they 
claim that the entire political system should be responsive to all of the voters in 
the jurisdiction.31 Probably the fairest reading of their position is that they want 
all of these outputs to be responsive to all of these inputs at all of these levels. 
Legislators’ preferences and policy outcomes should be responsive to voters’ 
preferences and interests within particular districts and whole jurisdictions. 
In contrast to the responsiveness theory, the alignment theory is not 
concerned with the rate of change of some output given a shift in some input. 
Instead, the theory asserts that the levels of the input and of the output should 
correspond. At any moment in time, regardless of whatever swings have occurred 
or will occur, the input and the output should assume the same value along some 
                                                 
 
24 Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 1, at 646; see also, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 615 
(“[C]ompetition [is] critical to the ability of voters to ensure the responsiveness of elected officials to the voters' 
interests . . . .”); Pildes, supra note 1, at 125 (describing as key question for American politics whether “parties 
will face sufficient competitive pressures to keep them appropriately responsive to diverse interests”).  
The other democratic value that Issacharoff and Pildes believe is advanced by competition is 
accountability. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 623 (“[D]emocracy is defined primarily by the 
accountability of the elected to the electors, an accountability that is in turn shaped through competitive 
elections.”); Richard H. Pildes, Competitive, Deliberative, and Rights-Oriented Democracy, 3 ELECTION L.J. 
685, 688 (2004) (“[O]f the various structural goals of democracy, the one courts ought to focus on is ensuring 
competition and, through it, electoral accountability.”). We do not attempt to measure accountability in this 
Article. 
25 Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 615, 628 n.139. 
26 Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 1, at 646. 
27 Id. at 649, 673 
28 Id. at 680. 
29 Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 615.  
30 See, e.g., id.; Pildes, supra note 24, at 686. 
31 See, e.g. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 1, at 646; Pildes, supra note 1, at 42, 64 n.158. 
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common metric.32 (Of course, this means that alignment and responsiveness are 
related. A degree of responsiveness is necessary to achieve alignment whenever 
an input changes.)33 
At least as one of us has articulated it, the alignment theory offers a good 
deal of specificity as to which outputs should align with which inputs at which 
levels.34 In increasing order of ambitiousness, the relevant outputs are (1) 
legislators’ partisan affiliations, i.e., the party to which they belong; (2) 
legislators’ policy preferences, i.e., their specific issue positions and overall 
ideologies; and (3) public policy outcomes, i.e., the actual enactments of the 
elected branches. Also in increasing order, the relevant inputs are (1) voters’ 
partisan preferences, i.e., the party they would like to see in office; and (2) 
voters’ policy preferences, i.e., their specific issue positions and overall 
ideologies. And alignment can be conceptualized at the levels of (1) the 
individual district, in which the district’s representative and median voter should 
align; and (2) the entire legislative chamber, in which the body’s median member 
and the jurisdiction’s median voter should do so. 
Putting these pieces together, we can construct a taxonomy of alignment.35 
Partisan alignment refers to the congruence of legislators’ partisan affiliations 
and voters’ partisan preferences. Policy preference alignment (preference 
alignment for short) denotes the correspondence of legislators’ and voters’ policy 
positions. And policy outcome alignment (outcome alignment for short) means 
that public policy outcomes correspond to voters’ policy views. Moreover, all 
three types of alignment apply to the levels of both the individual district and the 
entire legislative chamber. (Though outcome alignment at the district level is 
essentially irrelevant since so little policy is set by individual constituencies). 
As we explain below,36 we choose to focus on preference alignment in this 
Article, at both the district and chamber levels. No single project could possibly 
analyze how all of the forms of alignment are related to all of the electoral rules 
that shape our political system. Because of the imprecision of Issacharoff and 
Pildes’s account, we also apply the taxonomy of alignment to responsiveness. 
We thus assess preference responsiveness—the rate of change of legislators’ 
policy positions given shifts in voters’ policy views—at the chamber level. While 
                                                 
 
32 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at 301; see also, e.g., Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, The 
Democratic Deficit in the States, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 148, 148 (2012) (“[B]y responsiveness, we mean a positive 
correlation between opinion and policy; by congruence, we mean that policy actually matches majority 
opinion.”); Boris Shor, All Together Now: Putting Congress, State Legislatures, and Individuals in a Common 
Ideological Space to Assess Representation at the Macro and Micro Levels 2 (Apr. 25, 2011) (noting that 
responsiveness “denotes the idea that legislators . . . respond to their constituents’ policy preferences” while 
congruence requires that “the preferences of constituents and the representative should match in some common 
metric”). 
33 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at 301 n.81. 
34 See id. at 304-13. 
35 See id. Careful readers may note that our terminology is slightly different here than in Stephanopoulos’s 
earlier work. What he previously called “policy alignment” we now refer to as “preference alignment.” 
36 See infra Section I.C. Of course, preference alignment is related to partisan alignment and outcome 
alignment. Because each party’s legislators usually hold similar ideologies, partisan alignment tends to lead to 
preference alignment. Similarly, because the median legislator is often the pivotal legislator for purposes of 
policy enactment, preference alignment tends to lead to outcome alignment. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, 
at 310-11. 
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our methodological decisions exclude several kinds of alignment and 
responsiveness from our study, we trust that our findings still will be of 
substantial interest. 
 
B. Prior Findings 
 
Not surprisingly, the scholars who have advanced the responsiveness and 
alignment theories have not themselves investigated which electoral policies 
promote these values and which do not. The scholars have drawn ably from the 
relevant academic literature and historical record, but they have not carried out 
their own empirical analysis. Democratic theory and quantitative inquiry seldom 
mix. 
However, a number of political scientists have explored the links between 
electoral rules and the various kinds of responsiveness and alignment. We 
summarize their findings here and critique them in the next section. For the sake 
of simplicity, we organize our discussion by the category of the rule: (1) 
franchise access, i.e., policies relating to the ability to vote; (2) party regulation, 
i.e., policies relating to parties’ nominee selection and ballot access; (3) 
campaign finance, i.e., policies relating to campaign contributions and 
expenditures; (4) redistricting, i.e., policies relating to the drawing of electoral 
districts; and (5) governmental structure, i.e., policies relating to the organization 
of the elected branches. These categories capture essentially all of the rules that 
constitute states’ electoral systems. 
Starting with access to the franchise, several studies have examined the 
consequences of restrictive policies for the partisan composition of the 
electorate—a plausible proxy for partisan alignment.37 Photo identification laws, 
for example, result in a pro-Republican swing of 0–1% because their bite is felt 
(a bit) more acutely by Democratic supporters.38 Likewise, the elimination of 
same-day registration produces a pro-Republican swing of about 5% because 
Democrats are more likely to take advantage of the policy where it is available.39 
On the other hand, the elimination of early voting produces a pro-Democratic 
swing of about 5% because Republicans are more inclined to cast their ballots 
ahead of election day.40 And early closing dates for voter registration and purges 
                                                 
 
37 The proxy is plausible because if a franchise restriction alters the partisan composition of the electorate, 
then the median actual voter diverges from the median eligible voter who would have participated in the 
absence of the restriction. See id. at 325-26. 
38 See Nate Cohn, Finally, Real Numbers on Voter ID, NEW REPUBLIC (July 22, 2013), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113986/voter-id-north-carolina-law-hurts-democrats; Brad T. Gomez, 
Uneven Hurdles: The Effect of Voter Identification Requirements on Voter Turnout 19 (April 2008); Nate 
Silver, Measuring the Effects of Voter Identification Laws, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 15, 2012), 
http://fivethirtyeight. blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/measuring-the-effects-of-voter-identification-laws/. 
39 See Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United 
States, 41 J. ECON. LIT. 7, 27 (2003); Barry C. Burden et al., Election Laws and Partisan Gains: The Effects of 
Early Voting and Same Day Registration on the Parties’ Vote Shares? 8 (2013). 
40 See Burden et al., supra note 39, at 8. 
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of voter rolls apparently do not skew the electorate in either party’s favor (though 
they do reduce turnout).41 
Second, a good deal of work has investigated whether the type of primary 
that a state holds—the highest-profile category of party regulation—is connected 
to the positions that politicians adopt.42 Some scholars have found that more 
inclusive primaries (i.e., primaries in which more voters are allowed to 
participate) benefit candidates with more moderate stances, thus potentially 
boosting preference alignment.43 Other scholars, including two of us, have 
concluded that primary type is largely unrelated to legislative polarization.44 In 
this literature, several studies measure voters’ as well as legislators’ preferences, 
typically including the former as controls in their models.45 One noteworthy 
study conducted a survey of California voters, quantified voters’ and legislators’ 
preferences on the same scale, and then compared the responsiveness and 
alignment of the state’s House members before and after the 2012 adoption of the 
top-two primary.46 The study found that the reform did not produce improvement 
along either metric.47 
Third, numerous studies have tested whether campaign finance regulations 
influence the partisan composition of the electorate or of the legislature.48 If the 
                                                 
 
41 See Glenn E. Mitchell & Christopher Wlezien, The Impact of Legal Constraints on Voter Registration, 
Turnout, and the Composition of the American Electorate, 17 POL. BEHAVIOR 179, 186, 195 (1995). 
Furthermore, studies have found that felon disenfranchisement laws are harmful to Democrats, though they 
have not quantified the magnitude of the pro-Republican swing. See, e.g., Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, 
Democratic Contraction? Political Consequences of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. 
SOC. REV. 777, 786–89 (2002). 
42 One study also has examined the implications of “sore loser” laws—provisions barring candidates 
defeated in primaries from running again in the general election—for politicians’ policy stances. See Barry C. 
Burden et al., Nominations and the Supply of Candidates: The Connection Between Sore Lower Laws and 
Congressional Polarization (2013). The study found that the laws are linked to greater extremism among both 
congressional candidates and representatives, and thus contribute to legislative polarization. See id. at 17-23. 
43 See, e.g., Will Bullock & Joshua D. Clinton, More a Molehill than a Mountain: The Effects of the 
Blanket Primary on Elected Officials’ Behavior from California, 73 J. POL. 915, 923 (2011); Elisabeth R. 
Gerber & Rebecca B. Morton, Primary Election Systems and Representation, 14 J.L., ECON. & ORG. 304, 313 
(1998); Kristin Kanthak & Rebecca Morton, The Effects of Electoral Rules on Congressional Primaries, in 
CONGRESSIONAL PRIMARIES AND THE POLITICS OF REPRESENTATION 116, 126 (Peter F. Galderisi et al. eds., 
2001); Christopher Westley et al., Primary Election Systems and Candidate Deviation, 30 E. ECON. J. 365, 371 
(2004). 
44 See, e.g., Thad Kousser et al., Reform and Representation: Assessing California’s Top-Two Primary 
and Redistricting Commission 7 (2013); McGhee et al., supra note 7, at 342-47. 
45 See, e.g., Bullock & Clinton, supra note 43, at 922; Gerber & Morton, supra note 43, at 314-18; 
McGhee et al., supra note 7, at 342. 
46 See Kousser et al., supra note 44. In a top-two primary, all candidates are listed on the same ballot, and 
all voters may cast a ballot for the candidate of their choice (of whatever party). The two candidates with the 
most votes, irrespective of party, then advance to the general election. 
47 See id. at 22-23. 
48 Another set of studies examine whether campaign finance regulations promote competitiveness, which 
itself may be correlated with responsiveness. This work typically finds that regulations do make races somewhat 
more competitive. See, e.g., Neil Malhotra, The Impact of Public Financing on Electoral Competition: Evidence 
from Arizona and Maine, 8 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 263, 274-77 (2008); David M. Primo et al., State Campaign 
Finance Reform, Competitiveness, and Party Advantage in Gubernatorial Elections, in THE MARKETPLACE OF 
DEMOCRACY: ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 269, 278 (Michael P. McDonald & John 
Samples eds., 2006); Thomas Stratmann & Francisco J. Aparicio-Castillo, Competition Policy for Elections: Do 
Campaign Contribution Limits Matter?, 127 PUB. CHOICE 177, 199 (2006). For a more extensive discussion of 
how campaign finance regulations affect alignment, see Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign 
Finance Law, 100 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 42-48). 
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regulations have such an effect, they may shift partisan alignment relative to a 
regime of unrestricted contributions and expenditures.49 Corporate spending 
bans, then, result in Democratic candidates winning 1% to 6% more seats in state 
legislatures.50 Corporate contribution limits produce a pro-Democratic seat swing 
of about 2% in state senates.51 Other types of contribution limits apparently have 
no impact on candidates’ vote margins in gubernatorial races.52 But higher 
individual contribution limits give rise to more extreme voting records by state 
legislators (because individual donors themselves are quite extreme).53 
Conversely, higher limits on donations by political parties54 and political action 
committees (PACs)55 are linked to more centrist voting records (because parties 
and PACs are relatively moderate). Higher individual limits thus may reduce 
preference alignment while higher party and PAC limits may increase it.56 
Fourth, a substantial literature, to which we have contributed in prior work, 
examines the implications of redistricting institutions and criteria for partisan 
bias and electoral responsiveness. (Partisan bias refers to the divergence in the 
share of seats that each party would win given the same share of the statewide 
vote.57 Electoral responsiveness denotes the rate at which a party gains or loses 
seats given changes in its statewide vote share.58) As to institutions, we have 
found that California’s new commission specifically,59 and redistricting 
commissions generally,60 produce declines in bias and gains in responsiveness. 
                                                 
 
49 The misalignment that may occur here is the divergence between the median actual voter and the 
median hypothetical voter exposed to more even outlays. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at 338-39. 
50 See Andrew B. Hall, Systemic Effects of Campaign Spending 28 (Mar. 24, 2013); Tilman Klumpp et al., 
Money Talks: The Impact of Citizens United on State Elections 9 (Sept. 2012). 
51 See Besley & Case, supra note 39, at 27.  
52 See DONALD A. GROSS & ROBERT K. GOIDEL, THE STATES OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 81 (2003); 
Primo et al., supra note 48, at 279. 
53 See Michael Barber, Ideological Donors, Contribution Limits, and the Polarization of State Legislatures 
4, 25, 37 (Sept. 4, 2013). 
54 See Raymond J. La Raja & Brian F. Schaffner, Do Party-Centered Campaign Finance Laws Increase 
Funding for Moderates and Challengers? 19-20 (Jan. 8-11, 2014); Ray La Raja & Brian Schaffner, Want to 
Reduce Polarization? Give Parties More Money, WASH. POST (July 21, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/07/21/want-to-reduce-polarization-give-parties-
more-money/. 
55 See Barber, supra note 53, at 4, 37; see also Adam Bonica, Ideology and Interests in the Political 
Marketplace, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 294, 295-98 (2013) (also finding that PACs are relatively moderate).  
56 Another group of studies investigate whether “clean money” public financing systems affect levels of 
polarization. They find that these systems either have no impact or in fact are polarizing. See Andrew B. Hall, 
How the Public Funding of Elections Increases Candidate Polarization 19 (Jan. 13, 2014); Jeffrey J. Harden & 
Justin H. Kirkland, Do Campaign Donors Influence Polarization? Evidence from Public Financing in the 
American States 23-24 (May 2, 2014); Seth E. Masket & Michael G. Miller, Does Public Election Funding 
Create More Extreme Legislators? Evidence from Arizona and Maine 9-15 (2014). 
57 See, e.g., Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting, 88 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 541, 545 (1994); Bernard Grofman & Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a 
Judicial Test for Partisan Gerrymandering After LULAC v. Perry, 6 ELECTION L.J. 2, 8 (2007). 
58 See, e.g., Gelman & King, supra note 57, at 542, 544; Grofman & King, supra note 57, at 9. 
59 See Vladimir Kogan & Eric McGhee, Redistricting California: An Evaluation of the Citizens 
Commission Final Plans, 4 CAL. L. POL. & POL’Y 1, 22-24 (2012) (displaying seat-vote curves indicating that 
commission-drawn plans are less biased and more responsive than prior plans). 
60 See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Consequences of Consequentialist Criteria, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. 
REV. 669, 710-15 app. tbls.2-5 (2014) (finding that commission usage reduces efficiency differential in state 
legislative elections and increases responsiveness in congressional elections); see also id. (finding that court 
usage also improves both partisan fairness and responsiveness). 
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Work by other scholars, analyzing both American and foreign commissions, 
confirms our findings.61 As to criteria, one of us has found that compactness 
worsens both bias and responsiveness,62 that respect for political subdivisions 
improves responsiveness but worsens bias,63 and that respect for communities of 
interest has varying effects depending on how it is measured.64 Again, work by 
other scholars corroborates the mixed record of line-drawing requirements.65 
Finally, a range of studies have looked into how aspects of governmental 
structure, in particular the voter initiative, shape the relationship between public 
opinion and actual public policy. The literature on the initiative is inconclusive, 
with some studies finding that its availability makes policy more responsive to 
and aligned with the public’s views,66 and other studies concluding that it has no 
such impact.67 Despite their divergent results, these studies all employ similar 
methodologies, using survey data to estimate public opinion and legislative 
enactments to measure public policy.68 The same approach has been exploited by 
a handful of very recent studies to evaluate two additional structural policies: the 
presence of term limits and the professionalism of state legislatures. These 
works’ findings are mixed as well, though they do hint that the policies may 
improve representation.69 
                                                 
 
61 See, e.g., Bruce E. Cain et al., Redistricting and Electoral Competitiveness in State Legislative Elections 
13 (Apr. 13, 2007); Gelman & King, supra note 57, at 543, 549, 552; Simon Jackman, Measuring Electoral 
Bias: Australia, 1949–93, 24 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 319, 345, 350 (1994); lan Siaroff, Electoral Bias in Quebec 
Since 1936, 4 CAN. POL. SCI. REV. 62, 66–67 (2010). 
62 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 60, at 710-15 app. tbls.2-5. 
63 See id. 
64 Compare id. (finding that respect for communities of interest has little effect on bias or responsiveness), 
with Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1903, 1944-48, 1963-66 (2012) (finding 
that spatial diversity, a proxy for district-community congruence, is linked to improvements in district-level 
representation and plan-level bias and responsiveness). 
65 See, e.g., Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography and 
Electoral Bias in Legislatures, 8 Q.J. POL. SCI. 239, 260-64 (2013) (finding that randomly drawn plans with 
compact districts tend to favor Republicans); Richard Forgette et al., Do Redistricting Principles and Practices 
Affect U.S. State Legislative Electoral Competition?, 9 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 151, 162-63 (2009) (finding that 
certain criteria increase competitiveness in state legislative races while others do not); Richard Forgette & 
Glenn Platt, Redistricting Principles and Incumbency Protection in the U.S. Congress, 24 POL. GEOGRAPHY 
934, 946 (2005) (same with respect to incumbent party vote share in congressional elections).  
66 See, e.g., Kevin Arcenaux, Direct Democracy and the Link Between Public Opinion and State Abortion 
Policy, 2 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 372, 380-82 (2002); Barry C. Burden, Institutions and Policy Representation 
in the States, 5 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 373, 384-85 (2005); Elisabeth R. Gerber, Legislative Response to the 
Threat of Popular Initiatives, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 99, 117-24 (1996); John G. Matsusaka, Popular Control of 
Public Policy: A Quantitative Approach, 5 Q.J. POL. SCI. 133, 145-46 (2010). Matsusaka also investigates the 
influence of several of the electoral policies discussed above on outcome alignment, finding no effect in most 
cases. See Matsusaka, supra, at 152-58. 
67 See, e.g., Devin Caughey & Christopher Warshaw, Dynamic Representation in the American States, 
1960-2012, at 23 (Aug. 24, 2014); Edward L. Lascher, Jr., Gun Behind the Door: Ballot Initiatives, State 
Policies, and Public Opinion, 58 J. POL. 760, 769 (1996); Lax & Phillips, supra note 32, at 160-62; James 
Monogan et al., Public Opinion, Organized Interests, and Policy Congruence in Initiative and Noninitiative 
U.S. States, 9 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 304, 312-19 (2009); Boris Shor, Congruence, Responsiveness, and 
Representation in American State Legislatures 23 (Aug. 25, 2014); Chris Tausanovitch & Christopher 
Warshaw, Representation in Municipal Government 23 (Mar. 2014). 
68 The one exception is Shor, supra note 67, who studies preference alignment at the chamber level, albeit 
cross-sectionally. 
69 See Caughey & Warshaw, supra note 67, at 23 (finding ambiguous but somewhat positive effects); Lax 
& Phillips, supra note 32, at 160-62 (finding positive effects); Shor, supra note 67, at 23 (finding no impact); 
Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 67, at 24 (finding no impact).  
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Of course, this brief review does not exhaust the literature on electoral 
policies and their consequences. But it should convey, at least in broad strokes, 
the questions that scholars have sought to answer, the techniques they have used, 
and the results of their investigations. In our view, the existing academic work is 
impressive in many respects, but it largely fails to assess preference 
responsiveness and alignment, especially with respect to electoral rules that vary 





The essential problem with the existing literature is that almost none of it 
measures both voters’ and representatives’ preferences. It therefore gives little 
help to courts and policymakers who would like to evaluate and formulate 
policies based on their implications for preference responsiveness and alignment. 
Take, for instance, the vast majority of franchise access and campaign finance 
studies. They typically ask whether franchise restrictions or campaign finance 
regulations alter the partisan makeup of the electorate or of the legislature.70 But 
neither voters’ partisan choices (in most elections71) nor legislators’ partisan 
affiliations are suitable proxies for policy preferences. The binary decision of 
which party to vote for, or to associate with, sheds little light on the more 
complex issue of political ideology. 
Similarly, the concepts of electoral responsiveness and partisan bias that 
preoccupy many redistricting scholars both link parties’ legislative seat shares to 
their statewide vote shares.72 These metrics too are indicative of voters’ and 
legislators’ partisan inclinations, but not of their policy views. They are helpful if 
one is interested in partisan responsiveness or alignment, but much less relevant 
if one’s concern is the relationship between voters’ and legislators’ policy 
preferences.  
Unlike this work, many of the party regulation studies do quantify 
legislators’ policy preferences, usually in order to see whether representation is 
affected by the type of primary that a state holds.73 Some of these studies also 
include measures of voters’ preferences in their analyses.74 But even in this 
                                                 
 
70 See, e.g., GROSS & GOIDEL, supra note 52, at 81 (considering only voters’ partisan choices); Burden, 
supra note 39, at 8 (same); Gomez, supra note 38, at 19 (same); Mitchell & Wlezien, supra note 41, at 186, 195 
(same); Primo et al., supra note 48, at 279.(same); see also, e.g., Hall, supra note 50, at 28 (considering only 
representatives’ partisan affiliations); Klumpp et al, supra note 50 (same). 
71 As we discuss below, voters’ partisan choices in presidential elections actually are quite good proxies 
for their political ideologies. See infra Section II.A. 
72 See, e.g., Cain et al., supra note 61, at 13 (using bias and responsiveness to analyze redistricting issues); 
Gelman & King, supra note 57, at 543, 549, 552 (same); Jackman, supra note 61, at 345, 350 (same); Kogan & 
McGhee, supra note 59, at 22-24 (same); Stephanopoulos, supra note 60, at 710-15 app. tbls.2-5 (same). 
73 See, e.g., Bullock & Clinton, supra note 43, at 921 (using roll call voting data to quantify 
representatives’ preferences); Gerber & Morton, supra note 43, at 313-14 (using interest group ratings to do so); 
Kousser et al., supra note 44, at 7 (using candidate survey data to do so); McGhee et al., supra note 7, at 341-42 
(also using roll call voting data); Westley, supra note 43, at 369 (also using interest group ratings). 
74 See, e.g., Bullock & Clinton, supra note 43, at 922; Gerber & Morton, supra note 43, at 314-18; 
McGhee et al., supra note 7, at 342. 
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literature, preference responsiveness and alignment almost never are examined 
directly. At best, voters’ preferences are treated as controls in the models; they 
are not actually used to estimate the democratic values that are of interest to us.75 
As far as we know, only a single study in this area has calculated responsiveness 
and alignment explicitly, and even this study was limited to a single state’s 
reform of its primary system.76 
Lastly, the governmental structure scholarship explores how public opinion 
is connected to actual policy outcomes, not to legislators’ policy preferences.77 
The scholarship gauges voters’ policy preferences using opinion surveys, but it 
does not apply the same approach to elected officials.78 Instead, it looks to 
statutory compilations and other official sources to determine which policies in 
fact have been enacted by the elected branches. As a result, the studies in this 
field are able to measure outcome responsiveness and alignment, but not 
preference responsiveness and alignment.79 
The other weakness we perceive in the existing literature is that most of it 
assesses electoral rules in congressional (or even higher-level) elections. Very 
little of it aims to ascertain the rules’ implications at the state legislative level, 
even though this is where the greatest policy variation and the largest number of 
constituencies can be found. For example, we are not aware of a single franchise 
access or governmental structure study that carries out its analysis at the state 
legislative level. Instead, these studies tend to investigate the effects of franchise 
restrictions and structural factors, respectively, in statewide elections and on 
statewide policy.80 Likewise, two of us have conducted the only study to date on 
the impact of primary type on state legislators’ policy positions.81 All of the other 
work in this domain has examined the link between primary type and U.S. House 
members’ views.82 The scholarship on redistricting is dominated by 
congressional studies as well. Our own contributions are among the very few 
studies that have scrutinized line-drawing institutions and criteria at the state 
legislative level.83 
The lone exception to our critique is the campaign finance literature, a good 
deal of which evaluates the effects of campaign finance regulations in state 
                                                 
 
75 See id. 
76 See Kousser et al., supra note 44; cf. Westley, supra note 43, at 369-70 (using residuals from regression 
of interest group ratings on district characteristics as proxy for preference alignment).  
77 See, e.g., Arcenaux, supra note 66, at 378 (examining state abortion policies); Burden, supra note 66, at 
380 (examining state abortion and death penalty policies); Gerber, supra note 66, at 112-13 (examining state 
abortion policies); Lax & Phillips, supra note 32, at 150-51 (examining array of state policies); Matsusaka, 
supra note 66, at 139-41 (same); Monogan et al., supra note 67, at 310 (examining overall state policy 
liberalism). 
78 See id. 
79 The one exception is again Shor, supra note 67, who studies preference alignment at the chamber level 
cross-sectionally. 
80 See supra notes 38-41, 66-69 (discussing these studies). 
81 See McGhee et al., supra note 7. 
82 See supra notes 42-47 (discussing these studies). 
83 See Kogan & McGhee, supra note 59, at 16-25; Stephanopoulos, supra note 60, at 679-86; cf., e.g., 
Cain et al., supra note 61, at 7-11; Forgette et al., supra note 65, at 158-61. 
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legislative elections.84 At the congressional level, the rules on campaign 
contributions and expenditures are set by federal law, meaning that there is no 
state-by-state variation whatsoever. The geographic divergences that allow 
meaningful conclusions to be drawn exist only at the state legislative level, and 
accordingly that is where several studies in this area have cast their attention.85 
Our assessment of the literature raises two related questions: First, why have 
existing studies not sought to measure preference responsiveness and alignment, 
especially at the state legislative level? And second, are preference 
responsiveness and alignment even worth measuring, given the literature’s 
manifest lack of interest in them? As to the first question, there likely are two 
reasons why the literature has not exhausted our subject of inquiry already. The 
first is that preference responsiveness and alignment were not defined clearly 
until relatively recently. For decades, political scientists focused on 
responsiveness alone, typically by calculating the correlation between some 
measure of public opinion and some metric of legislators’ policy views.86 The 
point that responsiveness refers to the rate of change of legislators’ preferences 
given some shift in voters’ preferences, while alignment denotes the congruence 
of voters’ and legislators’ preferences, was not grasped fully until the last decade 
or so.87 Indeed, prominent law professors and political scientists continue to 
confuse the two concepts on occasion.88 
The second reason why preference responsiveness and alignment have not 
been analyzed thoroughly, at least at the state legislative level, is that the 
necessary data for such analysis previously did not exist.89 At the congressional 
level, interest groups such as Americans for Democratic Action and the 
American Conservative Union have issued ratings of legislators’ voting records 
for decades,90 and in the 1980s, political scientists devised a technique for 
                                                 
 
84 See, e.g., Barber, supra note 53, at 8-9; Hall, supra note 56, at 6-7; La Raja & Schaffner, supra note 54, 
at 6-7; Malhotra, supra note 48, at 269-71; Primo et al., supra note 48, at 274-77; Stratmann & Aparicio-
Castillo, supra note 48, at 184-86. 
85 See id. 
86 See, e.g., Lax & Phillips, supra note 32, at 149 (noting that while “[t]he existing literature establishes a 
high degree of responsiveness to ideology,” “it cannot usually answer questions about congruence”); 
Matsusaka, supra note 66, at 136 (referring to “the conventional ‘correlation’ approach that uses preference 
proxies to measure responsiveness”); Shor, supra note 32, at 2 (explaining how methodological issues have 
“long bedeviled attempts to assess congruence at the state level,” “so analysts have typically had to fall back on 
responsiveness as a benchmark”). 
87 Some of the studies that make this point most clearly are Lax & Phillips, supra note 32, at 148; and 
Shor, supra note 32, at 2. See also supra note 32 (discussing these studies). 
88 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 165 (2003) (conflating 
“responsiveness to public opinion” with “align[ing] the behavior of politicians and officials with the people’s 
interests”); Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
136, 138 (2001) (using “responsiveness” and “congruence” interchangeably and referring to them as same 
“idea”); cf. John G. Matsusaka, Problems with a Methodology Used to Evaluate the Voter Initiative, 63 J. POL. 
1250, 1250-54 (2001) (criticizing several political scientists for confusing responsiveness and alignment). 
89 See Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 6, at 337 (“In the past, state politics scholars have been 
hindered by the unavailability of data on policy preferences at the level of state legislative districts.”). 
90 See ACU Ratings, AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE UNION, http://www.conservative.org/legislative-ratings 
(last visited Aug. 15, 2014); Voting Records, AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION, 
http://www.adaction.org/pages/publications/voting-records.php (last visited Aug. 15, 2014). 
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converting roll call voting data into ideological ideal points.91 Information on 
voters’ preferences in congressional districts also has long been available in the 
form of aggregated presidential election results92 and public opinion polling.93 At 
the state legislative level, on the other hand, the earliest ideal point estimates 
were generated in 2002,94 and reasonably complete estimates, based on roll call 
voting data from all ninety-nine state legislative chambers, were not released 
until 2011.95 Similarly, it was not until 2013 that either aggregated presidential 
election results or estimates of voters’ ideologies became available for most state 
legislative districts.96 And a unified database of all the electoral policies that 
shape states’ political systems—and that might be linked in some way to 
preference responsiveness and alignment—has never before been assembled. 
As for the second question, whether preference responsiveness and alignment 
are worth investigating in the first place, we believe they occupy a sort of sweet 
spot in the study of representation. Partisan responsiveness and alignment 
undoubtedly are important, but even when they are achieved, the relationship 
between voter and representative may remain gravely flawed. Assume, for 
instance, that in one election the median voter in a district is a Democrat and so is 
the candidate elected, and that in the next election the median voter and the 
winning candidate both are Republicans. Assume also that after the first election 
the politician’s voting record is far more liberal than the median voter would like, 
and that after the second it is far more conservative.97 Then we have partisan 
responsiveness and alignment—since the legislator’s partisan affiliation is 
responsive to and congruent with the median voter’s partisan preference—but we 
have a troubling lack of policy representation as well. After neither election does 
the legislator even remotely share the median voter’s policy views. 
Conversely, outcome responsiveness and alignment are significant too, but 
they strike us as overly ambitious goals for electoral rules to accomplish on their 
                                                 
 
91 See, e.g., KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF 
ROLL CALL VOTING (1997); Keith T. Poole & Steven Daniels, Ideology, Party, and Voting in the U.S. 
Congress, 1959-80, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 373 (1985). 
92 Every four years, the Cook Political Report publishes its partisan voter index (PVI), which “measures 
how each district performs at the presidential level compared to the nation as a whole.” Partisan Voter Index, 
COOK POLITICAL REPORT, http://cookpolitical.com/story/5604 (last visited Aug. 15, 2014). Political scientist 
Gary Jacobson also maintains a database of presidential election results aggregated by congressional district 
from 1946 to the present. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 60, at 679 n.40 (discussing this database). 
93 See, e.g., Joshua D. Clinton, Representation in Congress: Constituents and Roll Calls in the 106th 
House, 68 J. POL. 397 (2006); Warren E. Miller & Donald E. Stokes, Constituency Influence in Congress, 57 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 45 (1963); Boris Shor & Jon C. Rogowski, Congressional Voting by Spatial Reasoning, 
2000-2010 (Oct. 11, 2012). 
94 See John H. Aldrich & James S. Coleman Battista, Conditional Party Government in the States, 46 AM. 
J. POL. SCI. 164 (2002). 
95 See Shor & McCarty, supra note 8; see also Bonica, supra note 9 (estimating state legislators’ 
ideologies based on the identities of their campaign donors); cf. Barber, supra note 53, at 8 (“Until recently, no 
data existed to measure the ideology of state legislators over time.”). 
96 See McGhee et al., supra note 7; Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 6. 
97 This is a very plausible scenario in contemporary America—indeed it seems to be the norm. See, e.g., 
Stephen Ansolabehere et al., The Effects of Party and Preferences on Congressional Roll-Call Voting, 26 LEG. 
STUD. Q. 533, 541 (2001) (showing that distribution of legislators’ roll-call votes is far more bimodal than 
distribution of constituents’ opinions); Joseph Bafumi & Michael C. Herron, Leapfrog Representation and 
Extremism: A Study of American Voters and Their Members in Congress, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 519, 528 
(2010) (same). 
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own. The policies that actually are enacted by the elected branches indeed are the 
product, in part, of the rules that govern the electoral system. But they also are 
the product of myriad factors that are beyond the scope of these rules: politicians’ 
own interests and agendas, partisan pressures inside and outside the legislature, 
legislative structures and voting rules, relations between the legislative and 
executive branches, and so forth.98 Given all of these factors, we think it is 
unrealistic to expect electoral rules to bring about outcome responsiveness and 
alignment by themselves. For the same reason, we think scholars who are 
interested in the effects of these rules would do well to broaden their inquiries to 
other, more attainable types of representation. 
If partisan representation is not a demanding enough criterion, and outcome 
representation is too demanding, then preference representation seems just right 
to us. It recognizes that a democracy is not functioning well merely because 
legislators’ partisan affiliations and voters’ partisan preferences are linked. But it 
also does not ask of electoral rules more than they plausibly can deliver. Its more 
modest aim is simply to connect voters’ and legislators’ policy preferences, thus 
directly improving the quality of representation and indirectly increasing the 
likelihood of responsive and aligned policy outcomes. This is a valuable goal, in 
our view, and one that is well worth further exploration despite its neglect by the 
existing literature.99 We therefore devote the rest of this Article to our empirical 
analysis of electoral policies’ effects on preference responsiveness and 
alignment. 
 
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Our analysis begins with a description of the data we use. Most of our 
information on voters’ preferences, legislators’ preferences, and states’ electoral 
policies either has become available very recently, or has never been available 
until now. Next, we explain our methodology for calculating responsiveness and 
alignment. We estimate responsiveness (at the chamber level) by regressing the 
change in the median legislator’s preferences from one period to the next on the 
change in the median voter’s preferences. We estimate alignment (at both the 
district and chamber levels) by modeling legislators’ preferences as a function of 
their constituents’ preferences, and then computing the resulting regression 
residuals. These residuals capture the gap between the representation that would 
correspond to voters’ views and the representation the voters actually receive. 
                                                 
 
98 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at 360-65 (discussing these factors at length). 
99 For a selection of scholars who also have recognized the importance of preference responsiveness and 
alignment, see G. BINGHAM POWELL, JR., ELECTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY: MAJORITARIAN AND 
PROPORTIONAL VISIONS (2000) (“In contemporary democracies elections are supposed to establish connections 
that compel or greatly encourage the policymakers to do what the citizens want.”); Jane Mansbridge, Rethinking 
Representation, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 515, 526 (2003) (arguing that “constituent-representative congruence . . . 
. is a factor in each of the forms of representation”); and Michael D. McDonald et al., What Are Elections For? 
Conferring the Median Mandate, 34 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 1, 2 (2004) (“To be truly democratic, the rules for 
[elections] should empower the voter median by ensuring that it is also the policy position of the 
[representative].”). 
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Our findings on the effects of different electoral policies can be summarized 
most easily by issue area. First, among franchise access rules, identification 
requirements have little impact while early voting improves alignment. Second, 
among party regulations, sore loser laws are aligning while certain types of open 
primaries worsen alignment and responsiveness. Third, among campaign finance 
reforms, limits on individual contributions are aligning while public financing 
schemes are misaligning. Fourth, among redistricting policies, independent 
commission usage is aligning, while the effects of traditional line-drawing 
criteria vary by electoral level. And fifth, among variants of governmental 
structure, term limits are misaligning. There are other significant results in the 
models as well, but these are the most robust, in our view. 
Lastly, we perform a series of robustness checks to ensure that our findings 
are reliable. Specifically, we rerun our models using an alternative measure of 
responsiveness; omit states for which our estimates of presidential election 
results by state legislative district are less accurate; collapse our electoral policies 
into a much smaller number of categories; and replicate another political 
scientist’s analysis of how chamber-level alignment is affected by a number of 
reforms. On the whole, these checks strongly corroborate our results. 
 
A. Data Sources 
 
We noted earlier that data on voters’ preferences, legislators’ preferences, 
and electoral policies at the state legislative district level previously did not 
exist.100 This data now does exist, thanks to both our own efforts and those of 
other scholars, and it forms the foundation of this project. First, with respect to 
voters’ preferences, political scientists Chris Tausanovitch and Christopher 
Warshaw recently merged nine nationwide surveys, all carried out between 2004 
and 2011, with a total of 275,000 respondents.101 They then carried out a cutting-
edge statistical procedure known as multi-level regression and post-stratification, 
which enables accurate public opinion estimates to be generated even for 
relatively small populations.102 State legislative districts are among the 
geographic units for which Tausanovitch and Warshaw produced estimates of 
citizens’ policy preferences.103 These estimates would be ideal for our purposes 
were it not for the fact that they are available only for a single point in time (the 
entire 2004–2011 period).  
Because of this limitation, we also collected presidential election results 
aggregated by state legislative district, which do vary temporally. Presidential 
election results are widely considered an excellent proxy for voters’ policy 
preferences because they too are the product of voters’ underlying ideological 
views. In an article on the measurement of district-level public opinion, for 
                                                 
 
100 See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text. 
101 See Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 6, at 332. 
102 See id. at 333-36; see also Jeffrey Lax & Justin Phillips, How Should We Estimate Public Opinion in 
the States?, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 197, 109-10 (2009) (describing this technique in more detail). 
103 See Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 6, at 337-39 (using these estimates to analyze representation 
in state legislatures). 
19                                                Realities of Reform 
 
instance, Warshaw and Jonathan Rodden observe that “[e]mpirical researchers in 
need of a catchall one-dimensional proxy for district ideology have typically 
turned to the district-level presidential vote.”104 Similarly, the correlation 
between Tausanovitch and Warshaw’s public opinion estimates and 2008 
presidential vote shares is higher than 0.9 at the state level.105 We therefore feel 
comfortable using presidential data as our principal measure of voters’ 
preferences (though we also run certain models using Tausanovitch and 
Warshaw’s estimates).  
In prior work, one of us assembled presidential election results aggregated by 
state legislative district for 2000, 2004, and 2008.106 A group of Daily Kos 
analysts gathered this data for 2012.107 For 1992 and 1996, lastly, we submitted 
freedom of information requests to all fifty states, thereby obtaining the requisite 
results for several jurisdictions. For states that were unable to produce the data, 
we used county-level presidential election results to estimate the results by state 
legislative district.108 This procedure has been found to be quite accurate, 
especially for states with large numbers of counties, and thus is a reasonable 
alternative when the actual data is unavailable.109 Our resulting database of 
presidential election results aggregated by state legislative district is by far the 
most comprehensive of its kind. 
                                                 
 
104 Christopher Warshaw & Jonathan Rodden, How Should We Measure District-Level Public Opinion on 
Individual Issues?, 74 J. POL. 203, 211 (2012). For examples of political scientists using district-level 
presidential vote shares as a proxy for voters’ policy preferences, see Ansolabehere et al., supra note 97, at 540; 
Brandice Canes-Wrone et al., Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members‘ Voting, 
96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 127, 131 (2002); Seth E. Masket & Hans Noel, Serving Two Masters: Using Referenda 
to Assess Partisan Versus Dyadic Legislative Representation, 20 POL. RES. Q. 1, 3 (2011); and McGhee et al., 
supra note 7, at 342. But see Georgia Kernell, Giving Order to Districts: Estimating Voter Distributions with 
National Election Returns, 17 POL. ANALYSIS 215, 216-19 (2009) (noting that unless districts’ ideological 
variances are equal, presidential vote shares may be misleading). To the extent the presidential vote is a noisy 
proxy for actual district ideology, our coefficient estimates are biased downward, and any findings that do attain 
statistical significance are more credible. 
105 See Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 6, at 335; see also Kousser et al., supra note 44, at 11 
(finding correlation as high as 0.94 between estimates of district ideology and presidential vote shares); Masket 
& Noel, supra note 104, at 14 (also finding correlation above 0.9).  
106 This was Rogers. See McGhee et al., supra note 7, at 342 (using this data). This dataset is 
comprehensive except that it is missing Gore-Bush figures for the New Mexico Senate and the Arkansas, 
Colorado, and Mississippi state legislatures; and Kerry-Bush figures for the Florida and Mississippi state 
legislatures. 
107 See Daily Kos Elections' 2012 Election Results by Congressional and Legislative Districts, DAILY KOS 
(July 9, 2013), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/07/09/1220127/-Daily-Kos-Elections-2012-election-
results-by-congressional-and-legislative-districts. 
108 More specifically, we disaggregated the county-level data to the Census block group level on the basis 
of counties’ and block groups’ adult populations. We then aggregated back up to state legislative districts using 
district maps made available by the Census to determine which block groups are located in which districts. See 
Cartographic Boundary Files - State Legislative Districts - Upper and Lower, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/data/cbf/cbf_sld.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2014). This is the same 
procedure that other political scientists have employed as well. See Carl Eoin Klarner & C. Lockwood 
Reynolds, Using County Data to Estimate State Legislative District Characteristics; Shor & McCarty, supra 
note 8, at 543. 
109 See Klarner & Reynolds, supra note 108, at fig.1 (showing that correlation between estimated and 
actual presidential election results is higher than 0.7 for most states’ legislative districts); Shor & McCarty, 
supra note 8, at 543 (finding correlation above 0.8 for Texas state legislative districts’ estimated and actual 
presidential election results). 
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Second, with respect to legislators’ preferences, political scientists Boris 
Shor and Nolan McCarty recently compiled roll call voting data for all ninety-
nine state legislative chambers from 1993 to 2013.110 They then merged this data 
with candidates’ responses to a policy survey administered by Project Vote Smart 
over the last two decades.111 In combination, these two datasets enabled Shor and 
McCarty to calculate ideal points for all state legislators who served during the 
relevant timeframe.112 These ideal points serve as our core measure of legislators’ 
policy positions. They capture, on a single left-right axis, the ideologies of 
legislators in all states over nearly two decades. 
Unfortunately, the Shor and McCarty scores do not vary over time. As they 
acknowledge, “Because we bridge legislatures over time by estimating a single 
ideal point for each legislator, we do not allow for ideological drift by 
individuals.”113 However, the invariant nature of these scores is not overly 
worrisome since legislators usually maintain consistent positions over time114 and 
representation still may shift via replacement.115 As detailed below, we also take 
into account the scores’ invariability by including only newly elected legislators 
in our district-level analyses. That way each legislator (with each fixed ideal 
point) appears only once in our models.116 
We note as well that we considered using the ideal points that Adam Bonica 
recently generated using the identities of candidates’ campaign donors.117 These 
ideal points do vary over time as candidates’ donor bases shift.118 But because of 
the relatively small number of people who give to each state legislative 
candidate, the estimates are not very reliable at this low electoral level. They can 
distinguish crudely between liberal and conservative candidates, but, unlike the 
Shor and McCarty scores, they do not enable more fine-grained distinctions 
between types of liberalism and conservatism.119 Accordingly, despite their 
appealing temporal dynamism, we do not further employ the Bonica ideal points 
in this Article. 
Our final category of data is information about states’ electoral policies over 
the 1992–2012 period. How these policies influence responsiveness and 
alignment, of course, is the key question we seek to answer in this Article. We 
consulted a wide range of primary and secondary sources to ascertain which 
states implemented which policies at which times. As in our earlier review of the 
                                                 
 
110 See Shor & McCarty, supra note 8, at 533; see also Data, MEASURING AMERICAN LEGISLATURES (July 
2014), http://americanlegislatures.com/data/ (containing most recent update to Shor and McCarty scores).  
111 See Shor & McCarty, supra note 8, at 532-33. 
112 See id. at 533-37. 
113 Id. at 533. 
114 See Bafumi & Herron, supra note 97, at 526; Keith T. Poole, Changing Minds? Not in Congress!, 131 
PUBLIC CHOICE 435, 435 (2007) (presenting evidence that “members of Congress die in their ideological boots,” 
that is, “adopt an ideological position and maintain that position throughout their careers”).  
115 Since Shor and McCarty calculate separate ideal points for each legislator, if a given politician is 
replaced by another, then representation indeed may shift at the district level. 
116 See infra Section II.B. 
117 See Bonica, supra note 9, at 5-9. 
118 See id. at 13-15. 
119 See id. at 24 (noting correlations of only about 0.6 between Shor and McCarty and Bonica estimates of 
parties’ median legislators’ ideal points in state legislatures). 
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literature, we sorted the policies into five groups: (1) franchise access; (2) party 
regulation; (3) campaign finance; (4) redistricting; and (5) governmental 
structure.120 Below we provide information on the policies we coded within each 
group as well as the sources we relied upon to do so. It is worth noting again that 
no electoral policy database as extensive as ours has been assembled 
previously.121 
 
 Franchise access: requirements to show non-photo identification before 
voting; requirements to show photo identification before voting; 
requirements to prove citizenship before registering to vote; availability of 
early voting; availability of same-day voter registration; and felon 
disenfranchisement rules.122 
 
 Party regulation: type of party primary (open, semi-open, closed, semi-
closed, or nonpartisan); and “sore loser” laws banning candidates defeated in 
primaries from running again in general election.123 
 
 Campaign finance: individual contribution limits; corporate contribution 
limits; union contribution limits; PAC contribution limits; corporate spending 
bans; union spending bans; and public financing.124 
 
 Redistricting: criteria used for redistricting (compactness, respect for 
political subdivisions, respect for communities of interest, respect for prior 
district cores, and/or incumbency protection); and institution responsible for 
redistricting (unified government, divided government, commission, or 
court).125 
                                                 
 
120 See supra Section I.B. 
121 The most similar databases previously assembled are by Besley & Case, supra note 39, and Matsusaka, 
supra note 66.  
122 The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) provides data on most of these policies. See 
Absentee and Early Voting, NCSL, http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/absentee-and-early-
voting.aspx (last visited Aug. 15, 2014); Same Day Voter Registration, NCSL (Nov. 14, 2013), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/same-day-registration.aspx; Voter Identification 
Requirements, NCSL (Oct. 27, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id.aspx. The 
best source for early voting rules is Non-Precinct Place Voting, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Apr. 2, 2010), 
http://www.pewstates.org/research/reports/non-precinct-place-voting-85899378759. The best source for felon 
disenfranchisement rules is NICOLE D. PORTER, EXPANDING THE VOTE: STATE FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
REFORM, 1997-2010 (2010). We supplemented all of our sources for this project by consulting archived 
versions of online materials as well as current and prior compilations of state laws. 
123 For data on primary type, see McGhee et al., supra note 7, at 339-41. For data on sore loser laws, see 
Burden et al, supra note 42, at 34. 
124 NCSL is the best source for campaign finance laws in effect in recent years. See Contribution Limits – 
An Overview, NCSL (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/campaign-
contribution-limits-overview.aspx; Public Financing of Campaigns: An Overview, NCSL (Jan. 23, 2013), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/public-financing-of-campaigns-overview.aspx. The 
Federal Election Commission (FEC) is the best source for earlier years. See, e.g., FEC, CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
LAW 2002: A SUMMARY OF STATE CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS WITH QUICK RESEARCH CHARTS (2002), 
available at http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/cfl/cfl02/cfl02.shtml. For data on expenditure limits in particular, see 
Klumpp et al, supra note 50, at 16. 
125 Stephanopoulos has coded these redistricting policies in prior work. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 
60, at 690 n.90. NCSL again is the best secondary source for these policies. See NCSL, REDISTRICTING LAW 
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 Governmental structure: availability of voter initiative; availability of 





In combination, our three categories of data—on voters’ preferences, 
legislators’ preferences, and electoral policies—allow us to estimate the effects 
of different reforms on alignment and responsiveness. The first two types of data 
enable the calculation of alignment and responsiveness at the district and 
chamber levels. Once these concepts have been quantified, the third kind of data 
makes possible assessments of actual policy impact. Below we explain in more 
detail our strategies for measuring alignment and responsiveness and then 
investigating causality. 
Both alignment and responsiveness, again, refer to certain relationships 
between voters’ preferences and legislators’ preferences.127 Alignment denotes 
the congruence of these preferences, while responsiveness captures the rate of 
change of legislator ideology given a shift in constituent ideology.128 But while 
these definitions are clear in the abstract, complexities arise when voters’ and 
legislators’ preferences are gauged using different techniques. After all, who is to 
say what the relationship should be between voting record (our metric of 
legislator ideology) and the presidential vote (our usual metric of constituent 
ideology)? Theories of representation suggest there should be some connection, 
but they do not specify how strong this link should be. Notably, voters may 
expect different behavior from their state legislator than from their president, and 
may cast ballots based on different criteria in races for each office, thus rendering 
our metrics only weakly related.  
In all of the models we run, we respond to this concern by focusing on 
relative rather than absolute levels of alignment and responsiveness. Even though 
we may not know the ideal relationship between voting record and the 
presidential vote, we still may draw conclusions based on how this relationship 
                                                                                                                         
 
2010, at 125-27, 189-96, 201-53 (2009); NCSL, REDISTRICTING LAW 2000 (1999), available at 
http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/redist/red2000/red-tc.htm. For useful data on the 2000 and 
2010 cycles, see ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, http://redistricting.lls.edu/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2014). For useful 
data on the 1990 cycle, see Action on Redistricting Plans: 1991-99, NCSL (Oct. 24, 2003), 
http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/redist/Redsum/Action1990.htm.  
126 Voter initiative data is available at Initiative and Referendum States, NCSL (Sept. 2012), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/chart-of-the-initiative-states.aspx. Term limits data is 
available at The Term Limited States, NCSL (Jan. 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-
legislatures/chart-of-term-limits-states.aspx. Recall data is available at Recall of State Officials, NCSL (Sept. 
11, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/recall-of-state-officials.aspx. Peverill Squire 
has quantified legislative professionalism using criteria such as salary and benefits, time demands of service, 
and staff and resources. See PEVERILL SQUIRE, THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN LEGISLATURES: COLONIES, 
TERRITORIES, AND STATES (2012); Peverill Squire, Measuring State Legislative Professionalism: The Squire 
Index Revisited, 7 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 211, 213, 220-21 (2007). 
127 We are referring here (as throughout this Part and the next) to preference alignment and 
responsiveness, and not their other variants.  
128 See supra Section I.A. 
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changes after reforms are enacted.129 For instance, if alignment increases after a 
given policy is introduced (even with all the necessary controls included), then 
we may surmise that the policy improves representation despite our lack of 
certainty about the optimal level of alignment. Furthermore, when we calculate 
alignment and responsiveness, we incorporate our divergent metrics of voters’ 
and legislators’ preferences as follows. 
First, for alignment at the district level, we begin by regressing legislator 
ideology (captured by the Shor and McCarty scores) on voter ideology (captured 
by the presidential vote or the Tausanovitch and Warshaw scores). We consider 
only state house members in our models, because the staggered terms of many 
state senates make them more difficult to analyze. We also consider only newly 
elected legislators because otherwise, thanks to the static nature of the Shor and 
McCarty scores, incumbents would be included multiple times but always with 
the same ideal points.  
This analysis reveals the overall relationship between voters’ and legislators’ 
preferences. In other words, it indicates how a typical legislator would vote given 
the ideological views of her constituents. Once this relationship has been 
determined, the computation of alignment is straightforward. All we have to do is 
compare a legislator’s expected ideal point (given her voters’ preferences) with 
her actual ideal point. The difference between these two figures is known as a 
regression residual—and the smaller it is, the more closely aligned a legislator is 
with her constituents. 
It would be preferable, of course, if our metrics of voters’ and legislators’ 
preferences used the same scale. Then they could be compared directly, without 
any need to consider regression residuals. But only voters’ and legislators’ 
current preferences can be placed on the same axis (by surveying voters about 
issues that their legislators already have addressed through their roll call votes or 
through polls of their own).130 Voters and legislators’ past preferences cannot be 
standardized since the necessary voter surveys simply were not conducted. 
Accordingly, we have no choice but to use our residual technique to measure 
alignment. Fortunately, this technique has been employed previously by 
numerous scholars and is accepted widely in the field.131 It also produces very 
                                                 
 
129 See John D. Griffin, Party Polarization and Representation 10 (2013) (noting that in studies that 
“focus[] on relative representation over time,” various kinds of measurement error “will not affect our 
inferences”). 
130 For examples of studies using voter surveys to place voters’ and representatives’ current preferences on 
the same scale, see Bafumi & Herron, supra note 97, at 523-25, Cheryl Boudreau et al., Legal Interventions in 
the Market for Political Information: Lessons from Survey Experiments in Local Elections 19-21 (2013), 
Stephen A. Jessee, Spatial Voting in the 2004 Presidential Election, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 59, 64-68 (2009), 
Kousser et al., supra note 44, at 7, and Shor & Rogowski, supra note 93, at 6-14. 
131 See, e.g., Jon R. Bond et al., Explaining Challenger Quality in Congressional Elections, 47 J. POL. 510, 
519-20 (1985); David W. Brady et al., Primary Elections and Candidate Ideology: Out of Step with the Primary 
Electorate?, 32 LEG. STUD. Q. 79, 84 (2007); Daniel M. Butler, Discounting Disagreement: Experimental 
Evidence on How Legislators’ Rationalizations Contribute to Polarization 16 (2013); Westley et al., supra note 
43, at 369-70. But see Matsusaka, supra note 88, at 1250-56 (noting that this method makes a potentially 
inappropriate assumption as to the linear relationship between legislator and district ideology). 
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similar results to the direct comparison of voters’ and legislators’ preferences 
when they are available on the same scale.132 
Second, we calculate alignment at the chamber level—that is, how closely 
aligned the median legislator is with the median voter in the state—through a 
variant of the above procedure.133 But this time the basic units of our analysis are 
not individual districts but rather chambers in their entirety. We also consider all 
legislators here, not just newly elected ones, because our aim is to identify the 
median of the body as a whole. We thus regress the median legislator ideal point 
on the statewide presidential vote to determine the overall relationship between 
voter and legislator ideology at the chamber level. We then compare the expected 
median legislator ideal point with the actual median legislator ideal point to 
ascertain the level of alignment for each body. Again, the smaller the gap 
between the expected and actual ideal points, the better the chamber’s alignment, 
and vice versa.134 
Lastly, the invariancy of the Shor and McCarty scores means that we cannot 
calculate responsiveness at the district level. Responsiveness refers to the change 
in legislator ideology given a shift in voter ideology, but all of the legislators in 
our database have the same ideal points throughout their careers. Fortunately, this 
difficulty does not apply to the analysis of responsiveness at the chamber level.135 
At this level, the ideal point of the median legislator does vary over time—due to 
retirements, reelection losses, and redistricting—meaning that shifts are possible 
in our metrics for both voters’ and legislators’ preferences. We thus assess 
responsiveness by regressing the change in the median legislator ideal point from 
one year to another on the change in the statewide presidential vote over the same 
period.136 And because presidential elections take place only every four years, we 
use only voters’ preferences in those years and legislators’ preferences in the 
immediately subsequent years.137 
To make our methodology easier to grasp, Figure 1 shows graphically how 
we calculate alignment and responsiveness. The first chart displays legislator 
                                                 
 
132 Using a range of datasets in which voters’ and legislators’ preferences were on the same scale, we 
obtained very high correlations (typically above 0.85) between the regression residuals and the congruence 
scores produced by subtracting the voters’ preferences from the legislators’ preferences. However, since the 
relationship is not perfect, our residual technique does introduce some additional noise compared to the direct 
comparison of voters’ and legislators’ preferences. 
133 For one of the few studies to examine state-level alignment, see Bafumi & Herron, supra note 97, at 
534-38. 
134 Because this method uses all legislators in each chamber (with their static ideal points), it is biased 
against finding effects for electoral policies. Any effects we do find thus are more credible. 
135 At the chamber level, one can conceive of both temporal responsiveness (the kind we study) and 
spatial responsiveness, i.e., the extent to which legislator ideal points change as one moves geographically from 
less to more conservative districts. See John D. Griffin, Electoral Competition and Democratic Responsiveness: 
A Defense of the Marginality Hypothesis, 68 J. POL. 911, 913-14 (2006) (distinguishing between “cross-district” 
and “within-district” responsiveness). We focus on temporal responsiveness because it better captures the value 
that Issacharoff and Pildes laud in their work. See supra Section I.A. 
136 This approach allows us to estimate responsiveness for subsets of our data as well. We simply include 
in the model only the states or years in which we are interested. 
137 This approach necessarily limits our data substantially. Also, as with chamber-level alignment, by 
including all legislators in our analysis, we bias it toward null results, and so increase our confidence in any 
non-null results. See supra note 134. 
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ideal point versus the district-level presidential vote for a random sampling of 
districts in our database, with a best fit line indicating the overall relationship 
between the variables.138 Our measure of district-level alignment is simply the 
vertical distance between each legislator’s ideal point and the best fit line. 
Analogously, the second chart illustrates median legislator ideal point versus the 
state-level presidential vote for all chambers in our database, with a best fit line 
included as well.139 Our measure of chamber-level alignment is the vertical 
distance between each median legislator’s ideal point and the best fit line. And 
the third chart depicts the change in median legislator ideal point from one year 
to another versus the change in the state-level presidential vote over the same 
period, again with a best fit line. Our measure of chamber-level responsiveness is 
the coefficient that results when the first shift is regressed on the second.140 
With our estimates of alignment and responsiveness in hand, we turn to the 
second stage of our analysis: determining how the metrics are affected by 
different electoral policies. We divide the policies into the same five categories 
as before—(1) franchise access; (2) party regulation; (3) campaign finance; (4) 
redistricting; and (5) governmental structure—though we also assess all of the 
policies in unison after concluding our more fine-grained examination. For each 
category, we carry out four OLS regressions: two for district-level alignment 
(one for Democrats and one for Republicans), a third for chamber-level 
alignment, and a fourth for chamber-level responsiveness.  
With respect to alignment, all of our models use the absolute value of the 
regression residual as the dependent variable.141 This strategy ensures that 
deviations in both a liberal and a conservative direction are treated analogously. 
All of our models also include the relevant policies as the key independent 
variables. And we consider Democrats and Republicans separately in our district-
level models to allow for the possibility of partisan differences in representation. 
With respect to responsiveness, the change in the median legislator’s ideal point 
is the dependent variable, and the key independent variables are the interactions 
of the policies with the change in the statewide presidential vote. The resulting 
interaction terms capture the policies’ effects on the sensitivity of the median 
legislator’s ideal point to shifts in the statewide presidential vote. That is, the 
terms capture chamber-level responsiveness itself.142 
It also is important to note that each model includes fixed effects for years 
and states. These fixed effects mean that each model features a full “difference-
                                                 
 
138 As noted earlier, this chart includes only newly elected legislators. It also includes a random sampling 
of districts, rather than all districts, for ease of presentation. For a similar chart using only 2004 data (and 
imputed rather than actual presidential vote shares), see Shor & McCarty, supra note 8, at 543. 
139 As also noted earlier, the median ideal points are computed using all legislators’ scores. For similar 
charts using 2000, 2004, and 2008 data, see id. at 544. 
140 And as noted earlier as well, we calculate responsiveness using only voters’ preferences in presidential 
election years and legislators’ preferences in the following years.  
141 Because the Shor/McCarty scores range from -3 to 3, the absolute values of the regression residuals 
theoretically may vary from 0 to 6, as may the treatment effects of the various policies we examine. In practice, 
the largest treatment effects are on the order of -0.5 or 0.5. 
142 For examples of other scholars using very similar modeling strategies to study responsiveness, see 
Griffin, supra note 135, at 916, and Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 67, at 20. 
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in-differences” design. The coefficient for each policy thus indicates the impact 
of the reform relative to both the state’s own prior history and developments in 
other states. This design controls for any time trends as well as any fixed 
differences among states due to politics, economics, demography, culture, or 
other factors. The design also capitalizes on the remarkable temporal and 
geographic variation of the policies in our database. It therefore brings us closer 
to the social scientific ideal of identifying the true causal effect of reform.143 
  
                                                 
 
143 For a good discussion (and application) of fixed effects regression, see McGhee et al., supra note 7, at 
343. Fixed effects are more appropriate here than random effects because the relevant clusters (years and states) 
are “of intrinsic interest,” and not merely “examples of possible clusters.” SOPHIA RABE-HESKETH & ANDERS 
SKRONDAL, I MULTILEVEL AND LONGITUDINAL MODELING USING STATA 97 (3d ed. 2012). Fixed effects also 
are a more rigorous test than random effects, and so less likely to give rise to statistically significant findings. 
We make our analysis more rigorous still by clustering standard errors in our models. 
Despite our best efforts, of course, we cannot be as sure of causality as we would like. It is possible, for 
instance, that the effect we attribute to a particular policy change actually is due to a simultaneous change in a 
state’s culture. We therefore encourage policymakers to carry out experiments that allow more robust 
conclusions to be drawn, such as implementing policies in some randomly chosen districts but not others, and 
then observing whether there are differences in representational outcomes. 
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We next present the results of our analysis. We begin with some summary 
statistics about alignment and responsiveness across the states and over time. 
These statistics provide a wealth of information about state legislative 
representation in contemporary America. We then proceed to our five electoral 
policy categories. For each category, we lay out hypotheses drawn from the 
existing literature about the effects of different reforms, describe the results of 
our models, and comment on their implications for the hypotheses. We conclude 
with a series of more comprehensive models that incorporate (almost) all of the 
policies in our database. These models capture the consequences of states’ 
electoral regulatory environments in their (near) entirety. 
 
1. Summary Statistics 
 
Starting with district-level alignment, Figure 2’s first chart shows the 
alignment of Democratic and Republican legislators in each state over the entire 
time period of our analysis.144 The closer a state is located to the chart’s origin, 
the more aligned its legislators tend to be with their constituents, and vice versa. 
One notable point is that just about every state’s legislators are quite misaligned. 
No state’s legislators are, on average, particularly near the origin. A second 
insight is that both Democrats and Republicans typically are misaligned in the 
direction of the ideological extremes. That is, Democrats tend to be too liberal for 
their constituents and Republicans tend to be too conservative. There is very little 
misalignment toward the ideological center.145 
Third, the parties’ misalignment is not symmetric. There are several states in 
which the average Democrat is almost perfectly aligned (e.g., Delaware, Georgia, 
Maryland, Oklahoma), and several in which she is extraordinarily misaligned 
(e.g., Arizona, California, Idaho, Wyoming). In contrast, the misalignment of the 
mean Republican varies much less. There are only a handful of states in which 
she is highly aligned (e.g., New York) or misaligned (e.g., California). Fourth, 
there seems to be a strong relationship between legislative polarization (which 
does not involve voters’ views) and misalignment (which does). States such as 
Arizona and California have very high levels of both polarization and 
misalignment, while states such as Delaware and Rhode Island score much better 
                                                 
 
144 To generate these state estimates, as well as the year estimates in Figure 2’s second chart, we regressed 
the real (as opposed to absolute) residuals on fixed-effect variables for states and years, separately for 
Democrats and Republicans. The predicted values from these regressions are displayed in the charts. This 
procedure helps account for changes in the composition of the sample, as not every state is represented in every 
year. For the state estimates, we generated predicted values for 2008, the last year in which virtually all states 
were present in the data. For the year estimates, we averaged all of the relevant state fixed-effects coefficients. 
145 This finding is consistent with other studies of alignment. See, e.g., Bafumi & Herron, supra note 97, at 
528 (“What is most striking . . . is the extremism of members of the U.S. House as compared to state median 
voters . . . .”); Kousser et al., supra note 44, at 40 (finding that members of U.S. House from California almost 
universally are more extreme than median voter in their districts). 
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on both metrics.146 This suggests that legislative polarization is the product not of 
a polarized electorate, but rather of legislators who diverge from their more 
centrist constituents.147 
Figure 2’s second chart displays the trends in mean district-level alignment 
from 1992 to 2010.148 From 1992 to 2006, the alignment of Democratic and 
Republican legislators was roughly constant and about equal in magnitude. 
During this period, there was no particular asymmetry in alignment, nor any 
major fluctuations in its levels. But from 2006 to 2010, Republican legislators 
became notably more misaligned with their constituents, while Democratic 
legislators became somewhat more aligned. Unlike in the past, there now is a 
clear partisan asymmetry in alignment, with Democratic legislators more 
accurately reflecting voters’ preferences than their Republican counterparts.149 
Turning to alignment at the collective level, Figure 3’s first chart indicates its 
values for all states and over all available years. The distribution is surprisingly 
balanced; there are almost exactly as many states where the median legislator is 
too liberal for the median voter as there are where she is too conservative. 
Another intriguing pattern is the tendency of states governed by Democrats to 
have overly liberal median legislators (e.g., California, Connecticut, 
Massachusetts), and of Republican-run states to have overly conservative median 
members (e.g., Michigan, Missouri, Ohio). It is possible that a party’s control of 
the legislature is associated with a sort of over-reaction, in which the median 
member veers further in the party’s direction than the median voter would like.150 
The distribution for chamber-level responsiveness, depicted in Figure 3’s 
second chart, is not as symmetric. In general, the median legislator is either 
moderately sensitive to changes in the statewide presidential vote (in the states on 
the right side of the chart) or largely insensitive (in the states on the center-left). 
But in a handful of outliers (e.g., Georgia, Indiana, Missouri), the median 
legislator is negatively responsive; as public opinion swings one way, she moves 
in the opposite direction. Also notable is the lack of correlation between 
alignment and responsiveness at the chamber level. States with high alignment 
scores do not stand out for their responsiveness, nor do states with high 
responsiveness scores stand out for their alignment. Indeed, the state with the 
                                                 
 
146 For data on polarization in state legislatures, see McGhee et al., supra note 7, at 342, and Shor & 
McCarty, supra note 8, at 546. 
147 This conclusion is bolstered by the earlier finding that state legislators typically are more extreme than 
their constituents. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. However, the relationship between polarization 
and misalignment likely is more complex than a simple correlation, and warrants further investigation. 
148 We do not have enough voting record data from the 2013 sessions to produce reliable estimates for 
legislators elected in 2012. 
149 This result is confirmed by another recent study of alignment, which also finds that today’s Republican 
state legislators are more ideologically distant from their constituents than are Democratic representatives. See 
Shor, supra note 67, at 11-15. However, the trends in polarization, at least at the national level, are quite 
different. Republican members of Congress have been growing steadily more conservative since the late 1970s, 
while their Democratic colleagues have been growing slightly more liberal for about half a century. Nothing in 
particular changed in 2006. See The Polarization of the Congressional Parties, VOTEVIEW.COM (Jan. 19, 2014), 
http://www.voteview.org/ political_polarization.asp.  
150 See Shor, supra note 67, at 16 (finding that “Republican-held chambers are more conservative than 
state opinion, while Democratic-held chambers are mostly, but not always, more liberal than their states”); cf. 
Lax & Phillips, supra note 32, at 157 (observing a similar pattern with respect to outcome alignment). 
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lowest responsiveness in the country, Georgia, is one of the best in terms of 
alignment. 
Lastly, Figure 4’s two charts present the trends in chamber-level alignment 
and responsiveness over the last two decades.151 (There are fewer data points in 
the second chart because, as noted earlier, we use only presidential election years 
and ensuing legislative sessions to calculate responsiveness.152) Unlike with 
district-level alignment, no obvious patterns are discernible in these charts. If one 
squints, the median legislator seems too conservative in the 1990s, too liberal in 
the 2000s, and too conservative again today, but the deviations are quite small. 
Responsiveness also has hovered around almost exactly the same value for the 
entire period of our analysis. At least at this level of aggregation, state legislative 
representation in America appears remarkably static. 
 
  
                                                 
 
151 Again, we have too little voting record data to show results for 2012/2013. See supra note 148. 
152 See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text. 
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FIGURE 4: CHAMBER-LEVEL ALIGNMENT AND RESPONSIVENESS OVER TIME 
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2. Franchise Access 
 
Having presented the summary statistics for alignment and responsiveness, 
we now proceed to the key question that this Article seeks to answer: how 
representation is affected by different electoral policies. We begin our discussion 
with laws that alter people’s access to the franchise. These laws include both 
measures that make it more difficult to vote (such as identification requirements, 
proof-of-citizenship requirements, and the disenfranchisement of felons) and 
measures that make voting easier (such as early voting and same-day 
registration).153 
In the literature, photo identification requirements are the most thoroughly 
studied of these policies, and the prevailing view is that they have only a 
marginal impact on the parties’ electoral performances.154 A plausible hypothesis, 
then, is that the requirements also have little effect on the electorate’s policy 
views, and so little effect on representation. Scholars have found as well that the 
adoption of same-day registration produces a mild pro-Democratic swing, while 
early voting and felon disenfranchisement modestly benefit Republicans.155 Since 
these policies do seem to have partisan consequences, it is reasonable to expect 
them to influence representation too. If the electorate’s partisan preferences 
change because of the policies, it would not be surprising for its policy 
preferences to shift in tandem. 
Unfortunately, we cannot use the presidential vote here to measure 
constituent opinion. Franchise access policies, unlike all the other laws we study, 
affect who votes in the first place (rather than how legislators represent their 
constituents). It thus is illogical to examine the policies’ impact on the 
representation of actual voters. The whole point of the policies is that they may 
change who these voters are. In place of the presidential vote, then, we use the 
Tausanovitch and Warshaw scores, which capture the ideology of citizens rather 
than of voters.156 Since franchise access policies do not affect citizenship, they 
are capable of influencing how citizens are represented. The policies are 
endogenous to the electorate but exogenous to the citizenry as a whole. 
While the Tausanovitch and Warshaw scores make it possible to assess 
franchise access policies, they have the drawback of being available only for the 
2004–2011 period in its entirety.157 We therefore are limited to studying district-
level and chamber-level alignment during this timespan. We also cannot study 
responsiveness at all, because we have no change over time in our measure of 
                                                 
 
153 See supra note 122 and accompanying text (describing franchise access policies in our database). 
154 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
155 See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. 
156 See Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 6, at 330 (noting that their “super-survey” includes “275,000 
citizens in all 50 states”). Our use of the Tausanovitch and Warshaw scores means that, in this section, we are 
studying the representation of the median citizen, not the median voter. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at 
325 (noting that franchise access restrictions can produce “divergence between the median actual voter and the 
median eligible voter who would have gone to the polls in the absence of the restrictions”). 
157 See Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 6, at 332. 
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constituent opinion.158 Despite these constraints, we believe the analysis we carry 
out is quite valuable. Franchise access policies have attracted a good deal of 
attention in recent years, but their implications for representation have yet to be 
examined. 
As shown in Figure 5, then,159 we find that the restrictive policies in our 
database have ambiguous effects on district-level and chamber-level alignment. 
At the district level, strict requirements for non-photo identification are 
misaligning for Democrats, while proof-of-citizenship requirements are aligning 
for them. At the chamber level, strict requirements for photo identification are 
misaligning, flexible requirements for non-photo identification are weakly 
misaligning,160 and flexible requirements for photo identification are aligning. 
Our findings are more intelligible for policies that expand access to the franchise. 
None of these policies has a significant impact at the chamber level, while early 
voting is aligning for both Democrats and Republicans at the district level. 
On balance, these results support the hypothesis that identification 
requirements have a minor impact on representation. Just as they barely alter the 
parties’ vote shares, so too do they have either unclear effects or none at all on 
district-level and chamber-level alignment. However, the measures’ chamber-
level consequences provide some cause for concern (or, at least, further study). 
While the relevant coefficients do not all point in the same direction, they do 
suggest that identification requirements are more likely to be misaligning than 
aligning. Perhaps the requirements produce non-congruence that is too minor to 
register at the district level, but that aggregates into more substantial 
misalignment at the chamber level.  
The results also bolster the hypothesis that early voting influences 
representation. The practice is linked to improved alignment for both Democrats 
and Republicans at the district level (though not at the chamber level). A possible 
explanation is that early voting increases turnout and so shrinks the gap between 
the median actual voter (to whom legislators may be especially attentive) and the 
median citizen included in Tausanovitch and Warshaw’s surveys. In other words, 
early voting may make the median citizen more electorally significant to 
legislators, and so motivate them to better align their positions with hers.161 
However, the results do not substantiate the hypotheses that same-day 
registration and felon disenfranchisement have significant impacts on 
representation. These measures do not influence alignment by either Democrats 
or Republicans, at either the district or chamber levels. Why not? With respect to 
same-day registration, one possibility is that the voters who take advantage of the 
                                                 
 
158 See supra note 135 and accompanying text (explaining that responsiveness cannot be calculated unless 
measures of constituent and legislator opinion both vary over time). 
159 We use coefficient charts rather than data tables to present the results of all of our regressions. The dot 
for each policy represents its regression coefficient, while the lines to each side indicate the standard errors (at 
the 5% significance level). 
160 We refer to effects as “weak” when they are significant only at the 10% level. For details on different 
identification requirements, see Voter Identification Requirements, supra note 122. 
161 Though this hypothesis would not explain why early voting has a partisan valence in favor of 
Republicans. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
                                                  Realities of Reform  36 
 
policy are more likely to be Democrats, but not more likely to be liberals. The 
partisanship of the median voter thus might shift even as her ideology remains 
constant.162 And with respect to felon disenfranchisement, opinion surveys tend 
to exclude felons from their coverage.163 So felons’ views likely are omitted from 




                                                 
 
162 Cf. Burden et al., supra note 39, at 6-7 (observing that franchise access policies have various electoral 
and ideological effects that interrelate in complex ways). 
163 See Daniel Horn, Survey Research on the Political and Economic Attitudes of Felony Offenders in 
North Carolina 1 (2012) (“Felon populations are generally excluded from social and economic surveys 
distributed both nationally and sub nationally.”). 
37                                                Realities of Reform 
 




                                                  Realities of Reform  38 
 
3. Party Regulation 
 
We look next at regulations of political parties: measures that specify the 
type of primary a party must hold or that restrict candidates’ access to the ballot 
itself. Our database includes several kinds of more inclusive primaries (semi-
closed, semi-open, open, and nonpartisan),164 as well as one ballot access 
requirement: sore loser laws, which ban candidates who lose in the primaries 
from running again in the general election.165 As noted earlier, the literature on 
primary type is mixed, with studies coming to different conclusions as to whether 
it is linked to legislative polarization.166 In contrast, the lone study on sore loser 
laws found that they increase polarization.167 Assuming that representation and 
polarization are negatively related,168 we are left with no clear hypothesis as to 
the impact of primary type on alignment and responsiveness. But we might 
expect sore loser laws to cause scores on both metrics to decline. 
Unlike in the previous section,169 here there is no obstacle to using the 
presidential vote as our measure of voters’ preferences. To the extent party 
regulations affect representation, they do so by changing the stances taken by 
legislators—not by altering the general electorate.170 Since the presidential vote 
varies over time, we thus are able to analyze both alignment and responsiveness 
in this domain. The same is true for all of the other issue areas we cover, and so, 
for the sake of brevity, we do not mention our data usage again. 
As Figure 6 illustrates, we find, on the whole, that more inclusive primaries 
either do not influence representation or actually make it worse. Semi-closed, 
semi-open, open, and nonpartisan primaries all are misaligning for Democrats at 
the district level. Nonpartisan primaries also weakly reduce responsiveness at the 
chamber level (though they are aligning for Republicans at the district level). We 
further find that sore loser laws are aligning for both Democrats and Republicans 
at the district level. The provisions are aligning at the chamber level as well. 
Our results provide strong support for the more skeptical side of the debate 
over primary type. This camp contends that more inclusive primaries either have 
no impact on polarization or in fact are polarizing.171 Likewise, we find that these 
policies are neutral at best in terms of representation, and quite harmful at worst. 
Why do more inclusive primaries not attract more moderate voters, and so result 
in more centrist candidates winning their parties’ nominations? A large political 
science literature offers several answers.172 The primary electorate does not vary 
                                                 
 
164 The details of the different primary types are not important here, but they are covered in depth in 
McGhee et al., supra note 7, at 339-41. 
165 See supra note 123 and accompanying text (describing party regulations in our database). 
166 See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text. 
167 See supra note 42. 
168 See supra notes 146-147 and accompanying text (discussing summary statistics that provide support for 
this assumption). 
169 See supra Section II.C.2. 
170 Though different primary types obviously alter the primary electorate—indeed, that is their essential 
aim. One thus could not use primary election results to study the impact of primary type on the representation of 
the primary electorate. 
171 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
172 See McGhee et al., supra note 7, at 338-39 (discussing this literature at length).  
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much by primary type; primary voters do a poor job distinguishing between 
centrist and extreme candidates; and the donors and activists who drive 
campaigns view extremism (on their own side of the aisle) as a virtue, not a 
vice.173 Our results do not shed light on which of these mechanisms is most 
potent. But any of them would explain why more inclusive primaries fail to live 
up to their advocates’ hopes. 
As for our finding that sore loser laws improve alignment, it is squarely at 
odds with the hypothesis that they worsen representation. One reason for the 
discrepancy may be that our analysis is at the state legislative level, while the 
earlier work on the provisions examined their impact on congressional 
polarization. But even if sore loser laws are polarizing at the state legislative 
level too, it might be possible, at least in theory, for them simultaneously to be 
aligning.  
Take a heavily conservative district in a state without a sore loser law, and 
suppose that the loser in the Republican primary decides to run again in the 
general election. Suppose also that, with two Republicans splitting their party’s 
vote, a moderate Democrat squeaks to victory. Then substantial misalignment 
ensues between the Democrat and the district’s conservative median voter. But 
the Democrat likely reduces polarization by occupying the ideological center of 
the legislature. If this scenario is plausible, then it is not hard to see how a sore 
loser law would increase both alignment and polarization. The law would prevent 
the mismatch between the moderate Democrat and the conservative median 
voter. But it also would negate the Democrat’s centripetal influence in the 
legislature.174 Further research is necessary, of course, to determine if these 
effects are more than mere conjecture. 
 
  
                                                 
 
173 See id. 
174 The same analysis, of course, applies if a moderate Republican squeaks to victory in a heavily liberal 
district in the absence of a sore loser law. We also are aware that sore loser laws may have different electoral 
consequences in different kinds of districts. For more on these provisions, see generally Michael S. Kang, Sore 
Loser Laws and Democratic Contestation, 99 GEO. L.J. 1013 (2011). 
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4. Campaign Finance 
 
Campaign finance regulations are the third type of policy in our database, 
and they can be subdivided further into three groups: limits on contributions (by 
individuals, corporations, unions, or PACs), bans on expenditures (by 
corporations or unions),175 and public financing schemes of varying generosity.176 
A set of very recent studies assess these policies’ effects on polarization, 
generating a series of hypotheses for us to test.177 First, the studies find that 
individual donors are ideologically extreme and that limits on individual 
contributions reduce polarization.178 So we also might expect these limits to 
increase alignment and responsiveness.179 Second, the studies find that public 
financing schemes are polarizing because the public funds typically are tied to 
the receipt of donations from extreme individual donors.180 So we might expect 
these schemes to worsen representation. And third, the studies find that most 
PACs are relatively moderate and that limits on PAC donations increase 
polarization.181 So we might expect these limits to worsen representation as well.  
As Figure 7 indicates, limits on individual contributions improve district-
level alignment for both Democrats and Republicans, but are weakly misaligning 
at the chamber level. Limits on corporate contributions are misaligning for 
Republicans at the district level, but weakly increase chamber-level 
responsiveness. Bans on corporate spending are weakly aligning for Republicans 
at the district level, and aligning at the chamber level. Limits on union 
contributions are aligning for Republicans at the district level. PAC limits weakly 
reduce chamber-level responsiveness. And partial public financing is misaligning 
for both Democrats and Republicans at the district level, while full public 
financing is misaligning for Republicans at the district level.  
These results are consistent (for the most part182) with our hypotheses as to 
how individual contribution limits and public financing affect representation. 
Individual limits reduce polarization and, as expected, improve alignment. When 
legislators’ ideal points shift toward the center after donations from extreme 
                                                 
 
175 These bans are no longer constitutional after Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010). 
176 See supra note 124 and accompanying text (describing campaign finance regulations in our database). 
The vast majority of states have disclosure requirements as well. We omit these requirements from our analysis 
because they are ubiquitous and because we do not expect them to have any connection to alignment or 
responsiveness. 
177 See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text; see also Stephanopoulos, supra note 48 (manuscript at 
42-48) (discussing these studies in depth). We focus on the polarization studies rather than the literature on the 
partisan effects of campaign finance regulations, see supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text, because they 
are related more closely to our subject matter of representation. 
178 See supra notes 53, 56 and accompanying text. 
179 The reason for this expectation is, again, the apparent negative relationship between polarization and 
representation. See supra notes 146, 147, 168 and accompanying text. 
180 See supra note 56. 
181 See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. Unfortunately, the polarizing effects of limits on 
corporate or union contributions have yet to be investigated. The literature thus does not give rise to any 
hypotheses on these limits’ implications for alignment and responsiveness. 
182 The main exception is our finding that individual limits are misaligning at the chamber level. Because 
this finding is relatively weak (with significance only at the 10% level), and is contradicted by our district-level 
results, we put relatively little stock in it. 
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individual donors are curbed, the outcomes are a smaller gap between the parties 
at the legislative level—and a smaller gap between legislators and their 
constituents at the district level. Similarly, public financing exacerbates 
polarization and, as expected, worsens alignment. Candidates’ need to raise 
money from extreme individual donors, in order to qualify for public funds, 
motivates them to migrate toward the ideological fringes. The consequences are a 
more polarized legislature as well as legislators who are less aligned with their 
constituents. 
On the other hand, our findings provide scant support for the hypothesis that 
PAC limits worsen representation. The coefficients for these measures do not rise 
to statistical significance in any of our alignment models, and only weakly 
suggest a decline in responsiveness. Since past studies conclude that PAC limits 
are only modestly polarizing,183 these marginal results are not overly surprising. 
We also had no a priori expectations as to the effects of corporate or union 
restrictions184—but, if we had, they would not have been confirmed by our 
equivocal outcomes. In the models in which they are significant, corporate 
contribution limits worsen district-level alignment for Republicans but weakly 
improve responsiveness; while in the models in which they are significant, 
corporate spending bans boost district-level alignment for Republicans and 
chamber-level alignment. Likewise, union limits rise to statistical significance in 
just one of our models (Republican district-level alignment). Corporate and union 
restrictions plainly are worth further study, but for now the safest conclusion is 
that their implications for representation remain uncertain. 
 
  
                                                 
 
183 See Barber, supra note 53, at 38 (finding that effects of PAC limits on polarization are substantially 
smaller than those of individual limits). 
184 See supra note 181. 
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Redistricting is our fourth issue area, and it includes two kinds of policies: 
line-drawing criteria (compactness, respect for political subdivisions, respect for 
communities of interest, respect for prior district cores, and incumbent 
protection) and line-drawing institutions (legislature, independent commission, or 
court).185 As to criteria, the existing literature is inconclusive but suggests that 
their effects may vary by electoral level. At the district level, requirements such 
as compactness and respect for political subdivisions may improve representation 
by making constituencies more intelligible to voters and legislators.186 But at the 
chamber level, these criteria may weaken representation by increasing the 
likelihood of plans that favor a particular party: the Republicans, whose 
supporters usually are distributed more efficiently when the criteria are 
satisfied.187 As to institutions, past studies find that commissions and courts tend 
to enact fairer and more competitive plans than legislatures.188 So we might 
expect these bodies to be linked to heightened chamber-level alignment and 
responsiveness as well. 
As Figure 8 shows, compactness is aligning for both Democrats and 
Republicans at the district level, and misaligning at the chamber level. Respect 
for political subdivisions is aligning for Republicans but misaligning for 
Democrats at the district level, and also weakly increases chamber-level 
responsiveness. Respect for prior district cores is weakly aligning for Democrats 
at the district level, and misaligning at the chamber level. Incumbent protection is 
misaligning for Democrats at the district level, and weakly aligning at the 
chamber level. Commission usage is misaligning for Democrats and Republicans 
at the district level, and aligning at the chamber level. And court usage is aligning 
for Democrats at the district level. 
On balance, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that redistricting 
criteria improve representation at the district level but weaken it at the chamber 
level. Compactness and respect for prior district cores fit this narrative especially 
well, as they both increase district-level but reduce chamber-level alignment. In 
contrast, the story is more ambiguous for requirements such as respect for 
political subdivisions and incumbent protection. To the extent the narrative holds, 
it reveals yet another tradeoff in a domain that already is full of them. By 
adhering to traditional criteria when they craft districts, line-drawers promote 
closer alignment between voters and their individual representatives—a laudable 
goal. But, in so doing, line-drawers often produce a divergence between the 
state’s median voter and the chamber’s median legislator—an obviously 
                                                 
 
185 See supra note 125 and accompanying text (describing redistricting policies in our database). We also 
include the presence of divided government in our models, but do not discuss it further since it is not an actual 
policy choice. 
186 See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text; see also Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and 
the Territorial Community, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1379, 1471-72 (2012) (discussing relevant studies). 
187 See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text. 
188 See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. 
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unwelcome outcome. Whether to employ traditional criteria turns out to be a 
Hobbesian choice. 
Fortunately, the institutional question is not as vexing. The results support 
the hypothesis that independent commissions (though not courts189) improve 
representation at the chamber level. District plans drawn by commissions indeed 
feature higher levels of chamber-level alignment than plans drawn by the elected 
branches. This finding means that the benefits of commissions are not limited to 
the fairer conversion of the parties’ votes into legislative seats.190 Rather, the 
benefits extend to the congruence of the pivotal legislator with the state’s median 
voter. Institutional choice makes a substantive difference. 
 
  
                                                 
 
189 We also are unsure what to make of our district-level findings that commissions are misaligning for 
Democrats and Republicans and courts are aligning for Democrats. We had no hypotheses as to these 
institutions’ district-level effects, but they are worth further investigation. 
190 See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. 
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6. Governmental Structure 
 
Our fifth and final set of policies relate to governmental structure generally 
rather than election law specifically. These measures include the availability of 
the voter initiative, the ability to recall legislators, the presence of legislative term 
limits, and the level of legislative professionalism.191 Of these policies, the voter 
initiative is the most extensively researched.192 But the prior literature on the 
initiative’s effects on alignment and responsiveness is indeterminate,193 leaving 
us with no clear hypothesis as to its impact on representation. The literature on 
term limits and legislative professionalism is mixed as well (though mildly 
positive),194 and no study to date has examined the link between the legislator 
recall and representation. We thus have no strong expectations as to these 
policies’ consequences either. 
As Figure 9 illustrates, the voter initiative is misaligning for Democrats at the 
district level, and aligning at the chamber level. It also reduces chamber-level 
responsiveness. The legislator recall is misaligning at the chamber level. Term 
limits are misaligning for both Democrats and Republicans at the district level. 
And legislative professionalism is misaligning for Democrats at the district level. 
These results tend to bolster the pessimistic position in the debate over the 
voter initiative. While we do find that the initiative is aligning at the chamber 
level, we also find that it is misaligning for Democrats at the district level and 
reduces chamber-level responsiveness. We cannot conclude that the initiative 
improves representation overall, especially since we have no theoretical reason to 
discount the adverse findings. Apparently, the mechanism through which the 
initiative is said to boost alignment and responsiveness—legislators voting in 
accordance with their constituents’ views in order to avoid reversal by 
referendum195—operates rather fitfully. 
The results also help resolve the dispute over the representational effects of 
term limits. At the district level, both Democrats and Republicans are somewhat 
more misaligned with their constituents in states that limit legislative terms. Our 
models do not explain why term limits exert this negative influence on alignment. 
But they do suggest that the critics’ claims—that term limits prevent legislators 
from developing valuable expertise, and reduce their incentives to attend closely 
to their constituents—are more persuasive than the rejoinders.196  
Lastly, the results are no help either to backers of greater legislative 
professionalism. Democrats are more misaligned with their constituents in states 
with more professional legislatures, while professionalism has no impact in any 
                                                 
 
191 See supra note 126 and accompanying text (describing governmental structure provisions in our 
database). 
192 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. 
193 See id. 
194 See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
195 See Lax & Phillips, supra note 32, at 158 (observing that threat of being overruled “may then spur 
elected officials to make changes in their policy choices as a means of avoiding a ballot measure”). 
196 See Lynda W. Powell et al., Constituent Attention and Interest Representation, in INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE IN AMERICAN POLITICS: THE CASE OF TERM LIMITS 38, 38-39 (Karl T. Kurtz et al. eds., 2007) 
(discussing reasons why term limits might improve or weaken representation). 
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of the other models. How might legislative professionalism reduce district-level 
preference alignment while perhaps increasing chamber-level outcome alignment 
(as the literature hints)?197 The question requires further study, but one possibility 
is that parties in states with more professional legislatures are more disciplined 
and more motivated to attain (and retain) majority status.198 Such parties might 
pressure legislators to cast votes that are out of sync with the legislators’ own 
constituents, but that are congruent with the views of the state’s median voter. In 
this way, the parties simultaneously would promote district-level misalignment 
and chamber-level alignment. 
 
  
                                                 
 
197 See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
198 See Lax & Phillips, supra note 32, at 158 (noting that “[s]eats in professional chambers are also more 
valuable”). 
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7. Electoral Policies in Combination 
 
We conclude this Part by examining most of the electoral policies in our 
database in unison. These sorts of “kitchen sink” models serve as robustness 
checks for our earlier results, while also illuminating the operations of states’ 
electoral systems in their full complexity. To avoid overwhelming readers with 
extraneous detail, we focus on the key points that emerge from these broader 
models. We also omit franchise access policies from our analysis because, as 
noted above, they cannot be assessed using the presidential vote.199 
Beginning with party regulations, then, we find that they have largely the 
same effects that we identified previously. As Figure 10 indicates, more inclusive 
primaries have no impact or worsen alignment or responsiveness in most models, 
while sore loser laws are aligning at both the district and chamber levels. It is 
worth noting, though, that semi-open and nonpartisan primaries now are slightly 
aligning for Republicans at the district level. It thus is possible that these 
measures’ consequences vary by party. Next, our findings for campaign finance 
regulations also hold steady for the most part. Individual contribution limits 
remain aligning for Republicans at the district level, though they no longer rise to 
statistical significance for Democrats. Similarly, both types of public financing 
continue to be misaligning for Republicans at the district level. However, full 
public financing now is aligning for Democrats at the district level. 
Third, our results for redistricting policies essentially are unchanged from 
before. Line-drawing criteria such as compactness again are aligning at the 
district level and misaligning at the chamber level. (Though the district-level 
effects no longer register for respect for prior district cores.) Likewise, the use of 
independent commissions to draw district lines again improves chamber-level 
alignment. Lastly, the kitchen sink models require us to amend some of our 
assessments of governmental structure provisions. The voter initiative no longer 
worsens alignment at the district level or responsiveness at the chamber level, but 
remains aligning at the chamber level. So its impact on representation may be 
more positive than we surmised earlier. Analogously, term limits no longer are 
misaligning at the district level and indeed are mildly aligning at the chamber 
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8. Robustness Checks 
 
While the kitchen-sink models are our most important robustness checks, we 
also validate our results in four additional ways. First, we rerun our 
responsiveness models using different dependent and independent variables.200 
Specifically, we use the change in the median legislator ideal point divided by the 
change in the statewide presidential vote as the dependent variable, and the 
electoral policies themselves (not their interactions with the change in the 
statewide presidential vote) as the independent variables.201 This approach makes 
responsiveness itself the dependent variable, and it means that the policies’ 
coefficients can be interpreted as their direct effects on responsiveness. The 
approach also confirms that electoral reforms have next to no impact on 
responsiveness. In all of these models, not a single policy attains statistical 
significance. Responsiveness thus seems almost impossible to influence no 
matter how it is measured. 
Second, we exclude from our district-level alignment analysis states for 
which our estimates of the presidential vote aggregated by state legislative 
districts are less accurate.202 In their work on using county-level election results 
to approximate district-level results, Carl Klarner and Lockwood Reynolds 
conclude that the procedure is substantially less reliable in states whose county-
district “concordance” is 0.25 or below.203 We thus remove these largely 
northeastern states (Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Utah, and Vermont) 
from our database,204 and then rerun our district-level alignment models. Our 
results are largely unchanged. In fact, almost all of the coefficients are similarly 
signed and sized, and the only notable differences are that open primaries now 
are aligning for Republicans, individual contribution limits no longer are aligning 
for Republicans, commission usage no longer is misaligning for Republicans, and 
the legislator recall now is aligning for Democrats. Given the large number of 
policies in the models, these strike us as fairly minor variations. 
Third, to ensure that our findings are not being driven by slight policy 
differences, we consolidate our array of reforms into the following categories: all 
franchise restrictions (identification requirements, proof-of-citizenship 
requirements, and felon disenfranchisement); all franchise expansions (early 
voting and same-day registration); all open primaries (semi-closed, semi-open, 
open, and nonpartisan); all organizational campaign finance limits (on 
corporations, unions, and PACs), all public financing (partial and full); all 
constraining redistricting criteria (compactness and respect for political 
                                                 
 
200 The results of all of the models discussed in this section are available on request. 
201 For more information on our baseline responsiveness specification, see supra notes 135-137, 142 and 
accompanying text. 
202 As noted earlier, we obtained actual presidential election results aggregated by state legislative district 
for some states and years, and had to estimate them for others. See supra notes 108 and accompanying text. 
203 See Klarner & Reynolds, supra note 108, at fig.1 (showing that correlation between estimated and 
actual district-level results falls below 0.7 when concordance is 0.25 or below). 
204 See id. at tbl.1 (listing states by average county-district concordance over 1968-2010 period). 
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subdivisions, communities of interest, and prior district cores); all independent 
redistricting institutions (commissions and courts); and all structural limits on the 
legislature (voter initiative, legislator recall, and term limits). We then rerun our 
models with these broader policy groupings as the key independent variables.  
Our results paint a familiar picture. For example, franchise restrictions 
continue to have ambiguous effects at the district level, while franchise 
expansions continue to be aligning for both parties. Similarly, the records of open 
primaries and public financing remain poor, worsening alignment at the district 
level. And redistricting criteria continue to be misaligning at the district level too. 
On the other hand, organizational campaign finance limits now seem more 
attractive, improving alignment at the district level for Democrats and at the state 
level. But independent redistricting institutions now seem less appealing, with no 
significant impacts in any of the models. The overall substantive story thus 
changes only modestly when we shift from dozens of individual policies to a 
handful of policy categories. 
Lastly, we replicate the alignment analysis recently carried out by Shor using 
same-scale data for voters’ and legislators’ preferences.205 Our rationale for the 
replication is that if we obtain similar results using our regression residual 
technique, then it must make little difference whether representation is studied 
using same-scale data or regression residuals. Shor’s dependent variable is the 
distance of each party’s median member in each state legislative chamber from 
the state’s mean voter in 2008.206 His independent variables are the ideology of 
the median Republican member, chamber competitiveness, district magnitude, 
the use of a traditional party organization, and three electoral policies that we 
previously coded: the voter initiative, term limits, and legislative 
professionalism.207 We also are able to code Shor’s remaining independent 
variables. And we substitute our regression residual measure for Shor’s 
dependent variable, this time calculated only for 2008 and for parties’ rather than 
chambers’ median members. 
Like Shor, we find that median Republican ideology is strongly associated 
with greater party median misalignment.208 Our confirmation of this “by-now 
familiar result” is quite encouraging.209 Also like Shor, we find that use of a 
traditional party organization is linked to a significant improvement in alignment, 
and that the voter initiative, term limits, and legislative professionalism do not 
reach customary levels of statistical significance.210 However, Shor concluded 
that chamber competitiveness “very slightly” improves alignment, while we 
discern no such effect.211 Shor also concluded that district magnitude worsens 
                                                 
 
205 See Shor, supra note 67, at 19-23. 
206 See id. at 19. 
207 See id. at 19-20. 
208 See id. at 23. 
209 Id. at 20. 
210 See id. at 23. Legislative professionalism is significant at the 10% level in our model, in the same 
misaligning direction as in Shor’s. See id. 
211 Id. at 20. In fact, chamber competitiveness is significant at the 10% level in a misaligning direction in 
our model. 
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alignment, while it does not attain significance in our model.212 Still, the 
similarities between our analysis and Shor’s are much more conspicuous than the 
differences. They lead us to the conclusion that, indeed, representation may be 
evaluated effectively using our regression residual technique. 
 
* * * 
 
Having reviewed the results of our various models and robustness checks, it 
is worth reiterating that they are suggestive rather than definitive. More work is 
needed to determine with sufficient confidence how electoral policies affect 
representation in contemporary America. Indeed, in the above discussion we 
have tried to flag areas in which our conclusions are more tentative;213 and below 
we describe several worthwhile sequels to this Article that would add to the 
reliability of our findings.214 But it also is important to stress that our results are 
the product of a rigorous research design that comes close to allowing truly 
causal claims to be made.215 The results certainly can be refined (and we hope 
they will be), but they are robust enough already to give rise to clear implications 
for courts, policymakers, and academics. It is to these implications that we turn in 




Beginning with courts, then, our findings are most useful in cases where 
parties argue explicitly that challenged policies should be upheld because of their 
positive effects on representation. Such cases arise with some regularity, and our 
findings give courts the necessary tools to assess claims of this sort. More 
ambitiously, to the extent that courts are persuaded by either the alignment or 
responsiveness theories, our results permit them to start putting the theories into 
operation. Case outcomes would shift substantially in some areas if courts were 
to focus on representational impact (e.g., campaign finance and redistricting), 
while they would be largely unaffected in others (e.g., franchise access and party 
regulation). 
Next, our results have even plainer implications for policymakers. If they 
agree that alignment and responsiveness are compelling values, they should enact 
policies that promote them and repeal policies that undermine them. In brief, this 
would mean passing sore loser laws, early voting, individual contribution limits, 
and independent redistricting commissions; and eliminating public financing 
schemes, term limits, and inclusive primaries. Lastly, our findings hold different 
lessons for political scientists and law professors (our two academic audiences). 
For political scientists, this project gives rise to an exciting new research agenda. 
There are many ways to test and extend our analyses, all of them worth pursuing. 
                                                 
 
212 See id. at 23. 
213 See supra notes 147, 174, 184, 189, 198 and accompanying text. 
214 See infra Section III.C. 
215 See infra Section II.B. 
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For law professors, our results offer the first practical assessment of a pair of 
theories that lie at the heart of election law. Our results also suggest that, 
whatever the normative appeal of the responsiveness theory may be, its real-




It is fair to ask whether our findings are relevant at all to courts. The 
judiciary, it goes without saying, is not known for its interest in complex 
empirical analysis. We believe our findings are relevant for two reasons. First, 
parties in litigation sometimes assert that disputed policies should be sustained 
because of their positive impact on representation. In these cases, courts need 
some way to assess the validity of these claims. Second, courts often have 
expressed interest in the alignment and responsiveness theories (and have been 
urged by commentators to commit to them more fully).216 Because it is plausible 
that courts one day might implement these theories, it is important to know how 
the face of election law would change as a result. 
Jurisdictions have defended policies on the ground that they improve 
representation in several kinds of cases. In litigation over ballot access 
requirements (such as sore loser laws), for example, jurisdictions have argued 
that they “ensure that a minority of voters do not thwart the will of the 
majority.”217 That is, the provisions allegedly prevent the misalignment that 
ensues if a minor candidate qualifies for the ballot and then receives enough 
votes to change the election’s outcome. Similarly, in cases involving more 
inclusive primaries, jurisdictions have claimed that they make candidates “more 
responsive to the views and preferences of the electorate.”218 The measures 
ostensibly shift primary voters toward the ideological center and encourage 
candidates to follow suit. And in campaign finance cases, jurisdictions have 
contended that regulations induce officeholders to “decide issues [based on] . . . 
the desires of their constituencies” and not “according to the wishes of those who 
have made large financial contributions.”219 Regulations, in other words, are said 
to tether politicians’ voting records to their constituents’ preferences. 
In all of these cases, the parties’ arguments force courts to confront difficult 
empirical questions. How often do sore loser laws prevent wrong-winner 
outcomes? Do candidates become more responsive to voters when more inclusive 
primaries are adopted? Do campaign finance regulations make it more likely that 
                                                 
 
216 For discussions of the role that alignment and responsiveness have played in the Supreme Court’s 
existing doctrine, see Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 605-06, and Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at 316-20. 
217 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 56 (1968) (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 
405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972) (noting jurisdiction’s argument that ballot access requirement “seeks to . . . assure that 
the winner is the choice of a majority”). 
218 Cal. Dem. Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 586 (2000) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also, e.g., Tashjian 
v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 221 (1986) (noting jurisdiction’s argument that open primary 
would help candidates “appeal to the independent voter”). 
219 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153 (2003); see also, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government 
PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000) (noting jurisdiction’s argument that contribution limits address “broader threat 
from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors”). 
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officeholders will heed their constituents’ wishes? Courts need to answer these 
questions to determine whether the policies in fact advance the interests asserted 
by the jurisdictions. But, to date, courts have had little to go on beyond anecdotal 
evidence, self-serving testimony, and their own intuitions. In its ballot access 
cases, for instance, the Supreme Court has not referred to any data on the 
frequency of wrong-winner outcomes. Likewise, in the Court’s inclusive primary 
cases, an expert report on congressional polarization is the only relevant evidence 
that has been cited.220 And no study of how representation is affected by money 
in politics has yet appeared in the Court’s decisions. 
Now, however, rigorous social scientific results are available that bear 
directly on these issues. Thanks to our study, courts no longer need to guess what 
the representational effects are of sore loser laws, inclusive primaries, campaign 
finance regulations, and the like. Instead, courts may consult this Article’s 
findings—and, we hope, additional findings that other scholars will produce in 
the near future—and assess with more confidence how electoral rules influence 
alignment and responsiveness. In our view, this analysis marks a milestone for 
cases in which improved representation is the state interest submitted to justify a 
policy. This is an intrinsically empirical sort of interest, and now it indeed can be 
assessed empirically.  
While our results are most helpful in situations where litigants refer overtly 
to gains in representation, they also have potentially broader implications. In 
particular, were courts ever to heed scholars’ calls to adopt the alignment or 
responsiveness theories, then representational impact would be a crucial issue in 
every dispute—not only when raised by a party.221 Then every case would hinge 
not on the balancing of rights and countervailing interests, but rather on a 
policy’s effects on alignment and responsiveness. What might election law look 
like if such a transformation were to occur? Below we consider each of our five 
issue areas in turn, painting with a broad brush because doctrinal details are not 
our main concern here. 
First, the law of franchise access would change only modestly. The highest-
profile contemporary restrictions, identification requirements for voting, 
generally have been upheld by courts, including in a pair of Supreme Court 
decisions.222 These provisions also likely would be sustained by courts 
committed to the alignment or responsiveness theories. As discussed above, the 
laws’ representational effects are small and somewhat ambiguous.223 Courts 
would not be able to commend identification requirements, but they also would 
not be in a position to strike them down due to their harmful consequences. 
                                                 
 
220 See Jones, 530 U.S. at 580. This report notably did not address representation at the state legislative 
level. 
221 See supra Section I.A (discussing structural theories that urge courts to replace rights-and-interests 
balancing with direct consideration of underlying representational values). 
222 See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008) (upholding Indiana photo 
identification law); see also Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 6 (2006) (permitting Arizona identification law to 
be used in upcoming election). 
223 See supra Section II.C.2. Though if further study indicates that identification requirements in fact are 
misaligning at the chamber level (as our results hint), then the measures should be scrutinized much more 
closely.   
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Neutrality would be the appropriate judicial posture. On the other hand, courts 
might be more skeptical of cutbacks to early voting (which they typically have 
permitted to date224). Since early voting improves district-level alignment,225 its 
curtailment probably runs afoul of the alignment theory.  
Second, the Court’s party regulation doctrine would shift even less. In a 2000 
case, the Court struck down California’s blanket primary and criticized more 
inclusive primaries that are unwanted by the parties themselves.226 Such 
primaries also would be viewed suspiciously by courts applying the alignment 
theory. At both the district and chamber levels, these measures worsen alignment 
(especially for Democrats) or, at best, leave it unchanged.227 Similarly, the Court 
upheld sore loser laws in the one case it took in which they were challenged.228 
These provisions also would be sustained under the alignment or responsiveness 
theories, since they improve alignment at the district and chamber levels while 
having no impact on responsiveness.229 
Third, the law of campaign finance would undergo substantial modification. 
The Court has voided certain limits on donations from individuals to 
candidates,230 as well as aggregate limits on individual giving in an entire 
election cycle.231 But individual contribution limits improve alignment for both 
Democrats and Republicans at the district level.232 So courts likely would 
approve them under the alignment theory. Conversely, the Court recently 
nullified Arizona’s public financing system because it tried to equalize candidate 
spending.233 Public financing schemes also would be at risk under the alignment 
theory since they worsen alignment for both Democrats and Republicans at the 
district level.234 As for the Court’s landmark 2010 decision eliminating corporate 
and union spending bans,235 it resists assessment from a representational 
perspective. Spending bans have ambiguous effects on alignment and 
responsiveness, so it is not yet possible to reach conclusions about their 
validity.236 
                                                 
 
224 See, e.g., N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2014 WL 3892993, at *44 
(M.D.N.C. Aug. 8, 2014) (upholding cutback to early voting in North Carolina); Brown v. Detzner, 895 F. 
Supp. 2d 1236, 1256 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (same in Florida). 
225 See supra Section II.C.2. However, early voting does not affect chamber-level alignment. 
226 See Cal. Dem. Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 586 (2000). 
227 See supra Section II.C.3. Nonpartisan primaries are the one exception, as they improve Republican 
district-level alignment. 
228 See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 746 (1974). 
229 See supra Section II.C.3. 
230 See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 263 (2006). 
231 See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014) (plurality opinion). The Court also has struck 
down limits on individual expenditures. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39-51 (1976). 
232 See supra Section II.C.4. On the other hand, they are weakly misaligning at the chamber level. 
233 See Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2829 (2011); cf. Davis 
v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 745 (2008) (also nullifying Millionaires’ Amendment that aimed to equalize spending by 
changing contribution limits for candidates facing wealthy opponents). 
234 See supra Section II.C.4. However, neither form of public financing influences chamber-level 
alignment. 
235 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010). 
236 See supra Section II.C.4. We are similarly unable to reach firm conclusions about the validity of 
corporate and union contribution limits, whose effects also are ambiguous. 
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Fourth, the Court’s redistricting doctrine would change markedly as well. 
The Court tends to valorize traditional line-drawing criteria. Compliance with 
them is necessary to prevail in a Voting Rights Act suit,237 and deviations from 
them are probative both of invidious racial intent238 and, according to some 
Justices, unlawful partisan gerrymandering.239 But while these criteria commonly 
improve alignment at the district level, they more often worsen it at the chamber 
level.240 Courts thus would not afford them such positive treatment under the 
alignment theory. Likewise, the Court has not urged jurisdictions to adopt 
independent redistricting commissions in its partisan gerrymandering cases.241 
But since these commissions improve chamber-level alignment,242 their 
enactment would be a higher judicial priority under the alignment theory. 
Finally, courts are asked only rarely to determine the lawfulness of 
governmental structure provisions such as the voter initiative, the legislator 
recall, and term limits. The alignment and responsiveness theories therefore 
would have limited judicial applications in this domain. However, in a 1995 case, 
the Supreme Court did hold that term limits for congressional candidates are 
invalid because they are not mentioned by the Constitution itself.243 This outcome 
is consistent with the alignment theory’s prescriptions. Since term limits worsen 
alignment for both Democrats and Republicans at the district level,244 courts 
should disfavor the measures on representational grounds. 
We reiterate that we are offering only a preliminary sketch of how courts 
might operationalize the alignment and responsiveness theories. It goes without 
saying that our results must be confirmed by other scholars before they can be 
relied on in litigation. It also goes without saying that the judicial inquiry under 
the theories cannot be as crude as simply voiding all policies with adverse 
representational effects and upholding all policies with neutral or positive effects. 
Representational impact must be combined with other valid considerations—
existing precedent, judicial capacity, compelling non-representational values, and 
so forth—to craft workable doctrine. Accordingly, the above discussion should 
be construed as a preview of how election law doctrine might operate if the 
alignment or responsiveness theories ever became ascendant. But it is only that: a 




                                                 
 
237 See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986) (making geographic compactness a prerequisite for 
claims under Section 2 of Voting Rights Act). 
238 See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959-60 (1996) (plurality opinion); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 
900, 916-20 (1995). 
239 See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 347-50 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting); Davis v. Bandemer, 
478 U.S. 109, 176-77 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
240 See supra Section II.C.5. This account holds most clearly for compactness and respect for prior district 
cores. 
241 Indeed, the only opinion to have discussed commissions at any length was Justice Breyer’s dissent in 
Vieth. See 541 U.S. at 362-63 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
242 See supra Section II.C.5. On the other hand, commissions are misaligning at the district level. 
243 See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995). 
244 See supra Section II.C.6. However, term limits do not affect chamber-level alignment. 
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While a doctrinal revolution would have to take place before courts could 
embrace the alignment or responsiveness theories, no such pyrotechnics are 
necessary for them to be adopted by policymakers. Legislators, executives, and 
bureaucrats who are attracted to the representational values that underpin the 
theories simply could start enacting beneficial regulations and repealing harmful 
ones. What might a policy agenda aimed at optimizing representation look like? 
Below we offer a tentative first draft. 
We begin with the beneficial policies, ordered based on our confidence in 
their effects. First, sore loser laws are the measures that most consistently 
improve representation in our models, boosting alignment at both the district and 
chamber levels.245 The relatively few states that lack them thus should give 
serious thought to passing them. Second, early voting increases alignment at the 
district level while leaving it unchanged at the chamber level.246 It also should be 
a high priority for representationally minded policymakers. Third, individual 
contribution limits raise alignment at the district level but weakly lower it at the 
chamber level.247 In our view, the stronger district-level effects outweigh the 
weaker chamber-level impact, and justify the enactment of these limits. And 
fourth, independent redistricting commissions worsen district-level alignment but 
improve it at the chamber level.248 Since the point of commissions is to make 
district plans fairer in their entirety, we think the chamber-level result is more 
important, and supports the bodies’ adoption. 
Next we consider the harmful policies, again arranged according to the 
reliability of our findings. First, public financing systems are misaligning in three 
out of four district-level models, though they have no significant impact at the 
chamber level.249 The adverse district-level effects are enough to persuade us that 
these systems should be rethought (though not necessarily rejected altogether250). 
Second, term limits also are misaligning at the district level and neutral at the 
chamber level.251 The district-level consequences again lead us to believe that 
representation would be enhanced by amending or repealing these provisions. 
And third, more inclusive primaries all worsen Democratic district-level 
alignment, and one of them, the nonpartisan primary, reduces responsiveness 
too.252 But the nonpartisan primary also increases Republican district-level 
alignment.253 On balance, these measures do weaken representation, but the case 
against them is not airtight (and it also does not extend to other kinds of primary 
reform254). 
                                                 
 
245 See supra Section II.C.3. 
246 See supra Section II.C.2. 
247 See supra Section II.C.4. 
248 See supra Section II.C.5. 
249 See supra Section II.C.4. 
250 It is only speculation at this point, but there is reason to suppose that New York City’s multiple-match 
system improves alignment by attracting a donor pool that closely resembles the city’s population as a whole. 
See Stephanopoulos, supra note 48 (manuscript at 47-48) (discussing relevant studies). 
251 See supra Section II.C.6. 
252 See supra Section II.C.7. 
253 See id. 
254 See, e.g., SETH E. MASKET, NO MIDDLE GROUND: HOW INFORMAL PARTY ORGANIZATIONS CONTROL 
NOMINATIONS AND POLARIZE LEGISLATURES (2011) (explaining how California candidates’ ability to cross-file 
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This leaves us with a hodgepodge of policies whose effects are either mixed 
(identification requirements, corporate and union restrictions, traditional 
redistricting criteria, the voter initiative, and the legislator recall) or neutral 
(same-day registration, felon disenfranchisement, and PAC contribution 
limits).255 With respect to these policies, we cannot recommend that they be 
enacted by states that lack them or eliminated by states that employ them. 
Representational impact simply is not a useful metric for assessment here. At 
least until further evidence is available, we thus advise policymakers to consider 
these measures from perspectives other than their implications for alignment and 
responsiveness. 
As before, a host of caveats must be appended to this analysis. Our results 
require further validation before they can serve as a foundation for actual 
legislation. Even selfless policymakers care about values other than 
representation, and there is no guarantee that these values will point in the same 
directions as alignment and responsiveness. And many policymakers are self-
interested rather than selfless. These individuals actively may oppose measures 
that improve representation—and hence pressure them to take stances they would 
rather avoid. All of these points have merit, and their upshot is that the above 




Academics are the final group for whom this Article has important 
implications. The main interest of political scientists is likely to be 
methodological. All of the datasets we employ—voters’ preferences, legislators’ 
preferences, and electoral policies—can be refined in various ways, as can be our 
calculations of alignment and responsiveness. Political scientists probably will 
want to probe our techniques (and results) to see if they stand up to scrutiny. On 
the other hand, we expect the response of law professors to be more theoretically 
inclined. Like courts and policymakers, they may be curious about the 
representational effects of different reforms. They also may want to know what 
our findings mean for the validity of the alignment and responsiveness theories. 
In our view, our analysis tends to bolster the former theory and to undermine the 
latter. 
Starting with technical refinements, we can think of ways to improve all of 
our datasets and calculations. These improvements would go far in making our 
results dependable enough for use by courts and policymakers. First, with respect 
to voters’ preferences, it would be desirable to have a direct measure of their 
policy views that changes over time. Our usual metric, the presidential vote, only 
indirectly captures voters’ policy attitudes;256 while the Tausanovitch and 
                                                                                                                         
 
in multiple parties’ primaries dramatically reduced legislative polarization). Another reform that likely would be 
aligning would be eliminating the primary altogether and allowing voters to choose among all candidates in the 
general election (perhaps via instant-runoff voting).  
255 See supra Sections II.C.2-7. 
256 See supra notes 104-105 and accompanying text. 
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Warshaw scores, which are drawn from opinion surveys, are temporally static.257 
Perhaps the same statistical method that produces the Tausanovitch and Warshaw 
scores could be used to generate a dynamic measure of public opinion. (Though 
this would entail at least some loss of accuracy due to the smaller number of 
survey respondents in each individual year.258) 
Second, with respect to legislators’ preferences, our analysis is hamstrung by 
the unavailability of reliable ideal points that vary over time. Had such ideal 
points existed, we would have been able to include all legislators, not just newly 
elected ones, in our alignment models; and we would have been able to examine 
responsiveness at the district level too.259 Unfortunately, the accuracy of the 
Bonica scores, which are dynamic, probably cannot be improved since the 
number of campaign contributions received by each candidate cannot be 
increased.260 But it should be possible to produce a dynamic version of the Shor 
and McCarty scores, as the analogous NOMINATE scores for members of 
Congress are available in both static and dynamic forms.261 Time-variant ideal 
points for state legislators would enable further breakthroughs in the study of 
state legislative representation. 
Third, with respect to the electoral policies in our database, we coded almost 
all of them in binary fashion, simply noting whether or not they were used by 
each state in each year.262 This approach could be improved by placing certain 
laws on a continuous spectrum. For example, contribution limits could be 
assessed based on their dollar values,263 early voting could be gauged based on 
the number of days the polls are open, and so forth. Even more ambitiously, 
certain laws could be coded according to their effects rather than their existence. 
For instance, the actual compactness of a state’s districts could be considered 
instead of the presence of a compactness requirement, or the use of the legislator 
recall instead of its mere availability. It would not be surprising if a more 
sophisticated treatment of policies yielded more robust results.  
Lastly, alignment and responsiveness can be calculated in several ways, and 
it would be helpful to know whether our findings are sensitive to our choice of 
techniques. As long as voters’ and legislators’ preferences are on different scales, 
an alternative to our regression residual approach is to rescale the preferences so 
they have the same distributions. Then voters’ and legislators’ scores simply can 
                                                 
 
257 See supra notes 101-103 and accompanying text. 
258 Most of the individual surveys used by Tausanovitch and Warshaw had between 30,000 and 80,000 
respondents. These are large enough numbers for public opinion estimates to be computed for most (but 
probably not all) state legislative districts. See Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 6, at 332. 
259 See supra Section II.B. 
260 See supra notes 117-119 and accompanying text. 
261 See Description of NOMINATE Data, VOTEVIEW.COM (July 3, 2004), 
http://www.voteview.com/page2a.htm (explaining differences between D-NOMINATE, W-NOMINATE, and 
DW-NOMINATE scores). 
262 See supra notes 120-126 and accompanying text. The one exception is legislative professionalism, 
which is coded on a continuous scale. 
263 For an example of a study taking this approach, see Barber, supra note 53, at 30-31. 
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be compared to one another to determine their proximity.264 Another option 
(though not one that can be applied retrospectively) is to survey voters using 
questions that their legislators already have answered through their roll call votes. 
Then common-space ideal points can be produced for voters and legislators, 
allowing alignment to be computed directly, without any rescaling or residuals.265 
And we have limited ourselves in this Article to temporal responsiveness, but the 
concept also can be understood spatially. It would be interesting to find out how 
legislator ideology changes as voter ideology shifts from district to district (not 
from year to year).266 
These refinements are very important, and we plan to implement several of 
them in the near future (hopefully joined by other scholars). But legal academics 
likely are less interested in methodological details, and more concerned about the 
substantive and theoretical implications of our analysis. We already have covered 
the substantive lessons in our discussions of courts and policymakers, and do not 
repeat them here.267 At a theoretical level, the first key point is that the alignment 
and responsiveness theories indeed can be made empirically useful. To date, 
these theories have operated on quite an abstract plane—exalting certain 
representational values, criticizing approaches that neglect these values, and 
offering few specific prescriptions.268 But now the theories can begin providing 
practical benefits to a range of actors: to judges who want to decide cases in 
accordance with them, to leaders who hope to enact sound policies, and, yes, to 
legal academics who would like to argue with facts and not just norms. Now the 
theories have progressed from the ethereal to the concrete. 
By shedding empirical light on normative issues, this Article is the latest in a 
long line of election law scholarship. As Pam Karlan has explained, it is common 
in the field for courts (or academics) to announce a sweeping new principle, and 
then for social scientists to step into the breach to operationalize it.269 This is 
what happened after the Supreme Court enshrined the one-person, one-vote rule 
in the 1960s; the calculation of malapportionment began at once.270 It also is what 
took place after the Court made racial polarization in voting the linchpin of 
Voting Rights Act claims in the 1980s; empiricists rushed to compute 
polarization in elections throughout the country.271 The same sequence is 
                                                 
 
264 For an example of a study taking this approach, see Griffin, supra note 129, at 10-11. We prefer our 
regression residual approach because it does not make arbitrary assumptions about how voters’ or legislators’ 
preferences are distributed. 
265 For examples of studies taking this approach, see note 130, supra. This method requires the resources 
to conduct large enough surveys to generate voter ideal points at the desired electoral levels. It also can be used 
only to investigate current (as opposed to historical) representation. 
266 For examples of studies examining spatial responsiveness, see Griffin, supra note 135, at 913-15, and 
Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 67, at 17-20. As noted earlier, we focus on temporal responsiveness 
because it corresponds better to the value animating the Issacharoff and Pildes theory. See supra note 135. 
267 See supra Sections III.A-B. 
268 See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. 
269 See Pamela S. Karlan, Answering Questions, Questioning Answers, and the Roles of Empiricism in the 
Law of Democracy, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1269, 1272 (2013) (noting that “legal doctrine has asked a series of 
questions that social scientific methods are well positioned to answer”). 
270 See id. at 1272-73. 
271 See id. at 1273-76. 
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unfolding here. Academics have asserted that the central concern of election law 
should be the impact of different rules on alignment and responsiveness. And this 
Article, for the first time, tries to put some empirical meat on these normative 
bones. 
The second key point for law professors is that the alignment and 
responsiveness theories are not equivalent from a practical standpoint. Many 
electoral policies have positive or negative effects on alignment—for both 
Democratic and Republican legislators, at both the district and chamber levels.272 
In contrast, almost no policies have any influence on responsiveness. In all of the 
domain-specific models we ran, only a single reform, the voter initiative, had a 
statistically significant impact, and even this result evaporated in the kitchen-sink 
model.273 On the whole, it is fair to say that responsiveness does not budge in 
either direction due to the policies with which states experiment. It is serenely 
impervious to reform. 
Why is this the case? The third chart in Figure 1, showing change in median 
legislator ideal point versus change in the statewide presidential vote, provides at 
least a partial explanation.274 As the chart illustrates, there is almost no 
relationship between the two variables. Sometimes when a state’s electorate 
shifts in a Republican direction, the pivotal legislator becomes more 
conservative. But sometimes the pivotal legislator becomes more liberal, and 
even more often her ideology does not change at all. Weak and erratic 
responsiveness is the norm, at least at the chamber level. Given this reality, it is 
not overly surprising that very few policies have significant effects on 
responsiveness. It simply is too low and too unpredictable to be influenced much 
by reform. 
It is possible that this picture would change if responsiveness could be 
analyzed at the district level.275 Perhaps the far larger number of districts (relative 
to chambers) would permit the impact of different policies to be detected more 
clearly.276 For the time being, however, our conclusion is that the responsiveness 
theory is much less useful than the alignment theory. Unlike the alignment 
theory, it cannot be relied upon to distinguish between sound and unsound 
policies, or between doctrines that should be kept and ones that should be 
discarded. If nothing affects responsiveness, then nothing can be praised for 
heightening it or criticized for dampening it. To be clear, this is a practical 
objection to the responsiveness theory, not a normative one. The representational 
                                                 
 
272 See supra Sections II.C.2-7. 
273 See id. A few more policies attained statistical significance at the 10% level in at least one of our 
models: the semi-open primary, the nonpartisan primary, corporate contribution limits, PAC contribution limits, 
and respect for political subdivisions. See id.; see also Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 67, at 20-25 (also 
finding that institutions have little impact on responsiveness at municipal level). 
274 The second chart in Figure 4, showing the trend in chamber-level responsiveness over time, largely 
confirms this interpretation. Responsiveness barely shifts from year to year, suggesting it is mostly immune to 
changes in the electoral environment. 
275 It also is possible that the picture would change if a reliable time-variant measure of legislator ideology 
were available. Our use of a time-invariant measure biases our responsiveness scores toward zero. 
276 With respect to alignment, notably, we obtained more significant results in our district-level models 
than in our chamber-level ones. 
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ideal may well be a legislator whose positions shift swiftly in response to 
changes in public opinion. But this ideal is not much help if there is no way to 




The most notable development in election law over the last generation has 
been the emergence of the responsiveness and alignment theories. These theories 
reject conventional rights-and-interests balancing in favor of direct examination 
of electoral policies’ implications for key representational values. But, until now, 
the theories have been seriously deficient. They have provided no way for 
anyone to tell how reforms affect responsiveness and alignment. They have been 
caught in clouds of abstraction. 
This Article is an attempt to rectify this flaw. For the first time, we computed 
responsiveness and alignment scores for many states over many years, and 
catalogued all of the electoral policies in effect during this period. We then 
explored how the policies actually influence responsiveness at the chamber level 
and alignment at both the district and chamber levels. Our results hold valuable 
lessons for courts, policymakers, and academics. Even more importantly, they 
make it possible to begin operationalizing the theories—to begin converting what 
have been purely normative contentions into practical guidance for interested 
parties. We recognize that more work remains to be done before a topic as 
complex as representational impact is understood fully. But the Article takes a 
useful first step in this direction. It starts to pull the theories down from the 
clouds. 
  




Table A1.  Franchise Access and Alignment:  District-Level Results 
 
 Democrats  Republicans 
 S.E.   S.E. 
      
Intercept 0.52*** 0.16  0.64*** 0.12 






      
Strict Non-Photo ID 0.35* 0.15  -0.01 0.14 
      
Relaxed Photo ID 0.02 0.12  -0.03 0.06 
      
Strict Photo ID 0.03 0.15  0.00 0.12 
      
Proof of Citizenship -0.10* 0.04  0.01 0.05 
      
Early Voting -0.11* 0.05  -0.13* 0.05 












      
State fixed effects? Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects? Yes  Yes 
    
RMSE 0.32  0.33 
Adjusted R2 0.31  0.35 
N 1976  1873 
      
Note:  Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients.  * p<0.05, *** p<0.001 
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Table A2.  Franchise Access and Alignment:  State-Level Results 
 
  S.E. 
   
Intercept 0.07 0.08 
   
Relaxed Non-Photo 
ID 0.04# 0.02 
   
Strict Non-Photo ID 0.08 0.05 
   
Relaxed Photo ID -0.11** 0.04 
   
Strict Photo ID 0.15** 0.05 
   
Proof of Citizenship -0.02 0.05 
   
Early Voting -0.01 0.02 
   
Same-Day 
Registration 0.00 0.04 
   
Felon 
Disenfranchisement -0.02 0.04 
   
State fixed effects? Yes 
Year fixed effects? Yes 
  
RMSE 0.17 
Adjusted R2 0.47 
N 1719 
   
Note:  Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients.  # p<0.10, ** p<0.01 
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Table A3.  Party Regulation and Alignment:  District-Level Results 
 
 Democrats  Republicans 
 S.E.   S.E. 
      
Intercept 0.77*** 0.14  0.73*** 0.09 
      
Semi-Closed 0.24*** 0.03  -0.03 0.04 
      
Semi-Open 0.25** 0.09  -0.04 0.07 
      
Open 0.41** 0.13  -0.13 0.08 
      
Nonpartisan 0.22** 0.08  -0.12* 0.05 
      
Sore Loser Law -0.36*** 0.10  -0.32*** 0.07 
      
      
State fixed effects? Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects? Yes  Yes 
    
RMSE 0.29  0.29 
Adjusted R2 0.29  0.35 
N 6129  6121 
      
Note:  Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001 
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Table A4.  Party Regulation and Alignment:  State-Level Results 
 
  S.E. 
   
Intercept 0.20* 0.08 
   
Semi-Closed 0.03 0.03 
   
Semi-Open 0.02 0.05 
   
Open 0.10 0.08 
   
Nonpartisan 0.07 0.05 
   
Sore Loser Law -0.17*** 0.05 
   
   
State fixed effects? Yes 
Year fixed effects? Yes 
  
RMSE 0.17 
Adjusted R2 0.46 
N 1719 
   
Note:  Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients. * p<0.05, *** p<0.001 
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Intercept 0.92* 0.38 
   
Interactions with Change in Presidential Vote   
   
     Semi-Closed -0.01 0.02 
     Semi-Open -0.01 0.01 
     Open 0.03 0.02 
     Nonpartisan -0.04# 0.02 
     Sore Loser Law 0.01 0.02 
   
Main Effects   
   
     Semi-Closed 0.05 0.12 
     Semi-Open -0.53* 0.21 
     Open -0.46 0.44 
     Nonpartisan -0.14 0.20 
     Sore Loser Law -0.36 0.31 
   
Change in Presidential Vote 0.00 0.02 
   
   
State fixed effects? Yes 
Year fixed effects? Yes 
  
RMSE 0.36 
Adjusted R2 0.17 
N 317 
   
Note:  Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients.  # p<0.10, * p<0.05 
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Table A6.  Campaign Finance and Alignment:  District-Level Results 
 
 Democrats  Republicans 
 S.E.   S.E. 
      
Intercept 0.82*** 0.15  0.45*** 0.13 
      
Individual Contribution Limit -0.07* 0.03  -0.09* 0.04 
      
Corporate Contribution Limit -0.05 0.04  0.15*** 0.04 
      
Union Contribution Limit -0.02 0.03  -0.09* 0.04 
      
PAC Contribution Limit 0.05 0.03  -0.01 0.05 
      
Corporate Spending Ban 0.06 0.07  -0.08# 0.05 
      
Union Spending Ban -0.11 0.08  0.06 0.07 
      
Partial Public Financing 0.13* 0.06  0.36*** 0.04 
      
Full Public Financing 0.06 0.04  0.11* 0.05 
      
      
State fixed effects? Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects? Yes  Yes 
    
RMSE 0.29  0.29 
Adjusted R2 0.29  0.35 
N 6177  6178 
      
Note:  Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients.  # p<0.10, * p<0.05, *** 
p<0.001 
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Table A7.  Campaign Finance and Alignment:  State-Level Results 
 
  S.E. 
   
Intercept 0.16* 0.07 
   
Individual Contribution Limit 0.08# 0.04 
   
Corporate Contribution Limit -0.09 0.06 
   
Union Contribution Limit 0.02 0.04 
   
PAC Contribution Limit -0.07 0.05 
   
Corporate Spending Ban -0.11*** 0.03 
   
Union Spending Ban 0.04 0.03 
   
Partial Public Financing -0.04 0.03 
   
Full Public Financing -0.06 0.05 
   
   
State fixed effects? Yes 
Year fixed effects? Yes 
  
RMSE 0.17 
Adjusted R2 0.47 
N 1719 
   
Note:  Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients.  # p<0.10, * p<0.05, *** 
p<0.001 
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Intercept 0.56* 0.26 
   
Interactions with Change in Presidential Vote   
   
     Individual Contribution Limit 0.02 0.02 
     Corporate Contribution Limit 0.05# 0.02 
     Union Contribution Limit -0.04 0.03 
     PAC Contribution Limit -0.03# 0.02 
     Corporate Spending Ban 0.03 0.02 
     Union Spending Ban -0.02 0.03 
     Partial Public Financing 0.05 0.05 
     Full Public Financing -0.01 0.04 
   
Main Effects   
   
     Individual Contribution Limit 0.05 0.36 
     Corporate Contribution Limit 0.33 0.42 
     Union Contribution Limit -0.49* 0.23 
     PAC Contribution Limit -0.01 0.09 
     Corporate Spending Ban -0.44*** 0.12 
     Union Spending Ban 0.15 0.19 
     Partial Public Financing -1.45** 0.55 
   
Change in Presidential Vote 0.01 0.01 
   
   
State fixed effects? Yes 
Year fixed effects? Yes 
  
RMSE 0.33 
Adjusted R2 0.28 
N 317 
   
Note:  Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients.  # p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** 
p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
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Table A9.  Redistricting and Alignment:  District-Level Results 
 
 Democrats  Republicans 
 S.E.   S.E. 
      
Intercept 0.89*** 0.17  0.41** 0.15 
      
Compactness -0.42*** 0.10  -0.42*** 0.09 
      
Political Subdivisions 0.33*** 0.07  -0.12** 0.05 
      
Communities of Interest -0.07 0.05  0.00 0.04 
      
Prior District Core -0.10# 0.06  0.01 0.03 
      
Incumbent Protection 0.32** 0.10  0.00 0.09 
      
Divided Government -0.01 0.02  0.04# 0.02 
      
Commission Plan 0.14* 0.07  0.13** 0.04 
      
Court Plan -0.05* 0.02  -0.01 0.01 
      
      
State fixed effects? Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects? Yes  Yes 
    
RMSE 0.29  0.29 
Adjusted R2 0.29  0.35 
N 6177  6179 
      
Note:  Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients.  # p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** 
p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table A10.  Redistricting and Alignment:  State-Level Results 
 
  S.E. 
   
Intercept -0.27* 0.12 
   
Compactness 0.30*** 0.08 
   
Political Subdivisions 0.07 0.07 
   
Communities of Interest 0.00 0.06 
   
Prior District Core 0.13*** 0.04 
   
Incumbent Protection -0.15# 0.09 
   
Divided Government 0.01 0.02 
   
Commission Plan -0.09* 0.04 
   
Court Plan 0.00 0.02 
   
   
State fixed effects? Yes 
Year fixed effects? Yes 
  
RMSE 0.17 
Adjusted R2 0.47 
N 1719 
   
Note:  Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients.  # p<0.10, * p<0.05, *** 
p<0.001 
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Intercept 0.44 0.49 
   
Interactions with Change in Presidential Vote   
   
     Compactness 0.01 0.02 
     Political Subdivisions 0.03# 0.01 
     Communities of Interest -0.01 0.02 
     Prior District Core -0.01 0.02 
     Incumbent Protection 0.00 0.03 
     Divided Government 0.01 0.01 
     Commission Plan -0.01 0.02 
     Court Plan 0.06 0.04 
   
Main Effects   
   
     Compactness -0.39 0.26 
     Political Subdivisions -0.02 0.32 
     Communities of Interest 0.24 0.22 
     Prior District Core -0.02 0.15 
     Incumbent Protection -0.10 0.35 
     Divided Government -0.03 0.08 
     Commission Plan 0.08 0.20 
     Court Plan -0.36* 0.16 
   
Change in Presidential Vote -0.02 0.01 
   
   
State fixed effects? Yes 
Year fixed effects? Yes 
  
RMSE 0.36 
Adjusted R2 0.18 
N 317 
   
Note:  Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients.  # p<0.10, * p<0.05 
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Table A12.  Governmental Structure and Alignment:  District-Level 
Results 
 
 Democrats  Republicans 
 S.E.   S.E. 
      
Intercept 0.54*** 0.07  0.35*** 0.06 
      
Voter Initiative 0.26*** 0.07  0.00 0.06 
      
Legislator Recall -0.05 0.04  -0.06 0.04 
      
Term Limits 0.07*** 0.02  0.05** 0.02 
      
Legislative Professionalism 0.77*** 0.19  0.01 0.16 
      
      
State fixed effects? Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects? Yes  Yes 
    
RMSE 0.29  0.29 
Adjusted R2 0.29  0.35 
N 6170  6166 
      
Note:  Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients. ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table A13.  Governmental Structure and Alignment:  State-Level 
Results 
 
  S.E. 
   
Intercept 0.26*** 0.08 
   
Voter Initiative -0.41*** 0.09 
   
Legislator Recall 0.22** 0.07 
   
Term Limits -0.04 0.03 
   
Legislative Professionalism 0.08 0.29 
   
   
State fixed effects? Yes 
Year fixed effects? Yes 
  
RMSE 0.17 
Adjusted R2 0.47 
N 1683 
   
Note:  Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients. ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Intercept -0.27 0.30 
   
Interactions with Change in Presidential Vote   
   
     Voter Initiative -0.03* 0.02 
     Legislator Recall 0.01 0.01 
     Term Limits 0.01 0.01 
     Legislative Professionalism 0.02 0.08 
   
Main Effects   
   
     Voter Initiative 0.23 0.20 
     Legislator Recall -0.38 0.42 
     Term Limits 0.35# 0.19 
     Legislative Professionalism 2.92 2.48 
   
Change in Presidential Vote 0.03# 0.01 
   
   
State fixed effects? Yes 
Year fixed effects? Yes 
  
RMSE 0.36 
Adjusted R2 0.17 
N 309 
   
Note:  Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients.  # p<0.10, * p<0.05 
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Table A15.  All Electoral Policies and Alignment:  District-Level Results 
 
 Democrats  Republicans 
 S.E.   S.E. 
      
Intercept 0.65*** 0.18  1.53*** 0.15 
Semi-Closed 0.15*** 0.04  -0.07 0.05 
Semi-Open 0.29** 0.09  -0.13# 0.07 
Open 0.40** 0.13  -0.12 0.08 
Nonpartisan 0.22* 0.08  -0.12* 0.05 
Sore Loser Law -0.37*** 0.10  -0.32*** 0.08 
Individual Contribution Limit -0.04 0.04  -0.10* 0.04 
Corporate Contribution Limit -0.03 0.04  0.13** 0.04 
Union Contribution Limit -0.03 0.03  -0.08* 0.04 
PAC Contribution Limit 0.04 0.03  -0.01 0.05 
Corporate Spending Ban 0.08 0.07  -0.08# 0.05 
Union Spending Ban -0.13 0.08  0.04 0.07 
Partial Public Financing 0.03 0.17  0.39** 0.14 
Full Public Financing -0.10* 0.04  0.16** 0.05 
Compactness -0.35*** 0.11  -0.44*** 0.09 
Political Subdivisions 0.28*** 0.08  -0.19*** 0.05 
Communities of Interest -0.06 0.06  0.02 0.04 
Prior District Core -0.09 0.06  0.01 0.04 
Incumbent Protection 0.27* 0.12  -0.15 0.12 
Divided Government 0.02 0.02  0.01 0.02 
Commission Plan 0.22** 0.08  0.07 0.06 
Court Plan -0.03# 0.02  0.01 0.02 
Voter Initiative 0.22 0.14  -0.06 0.09 
Legislator Recall -0.03 0.04  -0.06 0.05 
Term Limits 0.01 0.02  0.02 0.02 
Legislative Professionalism 0.43* 0.20  -0.12 0.17 
      
State fixed effects? Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects? Yes  Yes 
    
RMSE 0.28  0.29 
Adjusted R2 0.30  0.36 
N 6129  6121 
      
Note:  Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients.  # p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** 
p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table A16.  All Electoral Policies and Alignment:  State-Level Results 
 
  S.E. 
   
Intercept 0.14 0.15 
Semi-Closed 0.05 0.03 
Semi-Open 0.11# 0.06 
Open 0.08 0.09 
Nonpartisan 0.11# 0.06 
Sore Loser Law -0.16** 0.05 
Individual Contribution Limit 0.06 0.04 
Corporate Contribution Limit -0.10# 0.06 
Union Contribution Limit 0.02 0.04 
PAC Contribution Limit -0.07 0.05 
Corporate Spending Ban -0.10** 0.03 
Union Spending Ban 0.04 0.03 
Partial Public Financing -0.05 0.04 
Full Public Financing -0.06 0.06 
Compactness 0.26*** 0.08 
Political Subdivisions 0.09 0.07 
Communities of Interest 0.02 0.06 
Prior District Core 0.12*** 0.04 
Incumbent Protection -0.18* 0.09 
Divided Government 0.03 0.02 
Commission Plan -0.14** 0.05 
Court Plan 0.01 0.02 
Voter Initiative -0.56*** 0.12 
Legislator Recall 0.21** 0.07 
Term Limits -0.09** 0.03 
Legislative Professionalism -0.02 0.31 
   
State fixed effects? Yes 
Year fixed effects? Yes 
  
RMSE 0.17 
Adjusted R2 0.49 
N 1683 
   
Note:  Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients.  # p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** 
p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
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Table A17.  All Electoral Policies and Responsiveness:  State-Level Results 
 
 
Interactions with Change in 
Presidential Vote 
 Main Effects 
  S.E.   S.E. 
      
Semi-Closed -0.04 0.04  -0.08 0.16 
Semi-Open -0.05# 0.03  -0.66 0.68 
Open 0.04 0.03  -0.93* 0.46 
Nonpartisan 0.02 0.05  -0.52* 0.21 
Sore Loser Law 0.06 0.04  -0.28 0.28 
Individual Contribution Limit 0.03 0.05  -0.55 0.96 
Corporate Contribution Limit 0.03 0.04  0.74 0.51 
Union Contribution Limit 0.01 0.05  -1.25*** 0.37 
PAC Contribution Limit -0.06# 0.03  1.30# 0.76 
Corporate Spending Ban 0.04 0.03  -0.39* 0.18 
Union Spending Ban -0.02 0.04  0.19 0.23 
Partial Public Financing -0.02 0.07  -1.19# 0.65 
Full Public Financing 0.00 0.08  -0.39 1.06 
Compactness -0.01 0.02  -0.49 0.53 
Political Subdivisions 0.01 0.03  -0.34 0.51 
Communities of Interest 0.00 0.03  0.03 0.38 
Prior District Core -0.02 0.05  0.14 0.22 
Incumbent Protection 0.01 0.06  -0.27 0.42 
Divided Government 0.00 0.03  0.03 0.16 
Commission Plan -0.04 0.03  0.79# 0.48 
Court Plan 0.04 0.05  -0.07 0.19 
Voter Initiative -0.02 0.04  -0.23 0.97 
Legislator Recall -0.04 0.03  -0.27 0.90 
Term Limits 0.02 0.02  0.55 0.29 
Legislative Professionalism -0.02 0.09  6.74*** 1.92 
      
Change in Presidential Vote    0.00 0.06 
Intercept    0.55 0.98 
      
State fixed effects? Yes 
Year fixed effects? Yes 
  
RMSE 0.32 
Adjusted R2 0.34 
N 313 
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